

## EXHIBIT NO. 173

## MEMOIRS OF PRINCE KONOYE

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 1 May 1946.

*Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.*

In accordance with your oral request, there is forwarded herewith a copy of the Memoirs of Prince Konoye. It is a translation prepared by the Language Section G-2, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, of a document turned over to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Prince Konoye. He stated that he had prepared the document during the period between the resignation of his cabinet in October 1941 and March 1942. This translation was checked by T. Ushiba, Konoye's personal secretary, who verified all of the factual data, raising questions only as to the literary style of the translation.

ROBERT M. DIGGS,  
*Capt., AUS.*

THE PROGRESS OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE TIME OF THE  
SECOND AND THIRD KONOYE CABINETS

March 1942

[1]

I

Beginning in December 1940, conversations for the readjustment of Japanese relations were conducted secretly between Bishop Walsh, president, and Mr. Draft, administrative secretary of Maryknoll (a high institution of American Catholicism), on the one hand, and Colonel IWAKURO of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry and Mr. Tadao IKAWA on the other.

By April 1941, the time had become ripe for the Governments of the two countries to conduct the conversations themselves. It should be remembered that because of the personal connections of the participants in the conversations from the first, private contact was maintained between President Roosevelt himself and Mr. Hull on the American side, and between Ambassador NOMURA and the Japanese Military and Naval Attachés in Washington on the Japanese side. Thus, both the President and the Japanese Ambassador were kept informed of what was going on.

On April 8th, the first tentative plan was presented by the American side, and after examining this, the Japanese side drew up a second tentative plan. On April 14th, and 16th, Mr. Hull held the first of the series of conversations on this problem with Ambassador NOMURA. At this time, Mr. Hull stated that the conversations theretofore conducted by private persons might be taken over by unofficial conversations between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador, and that the negotiations might be conducted with the second tentative plan as a basis. At the same time he expressed the wish that the Ambassador obtain official instructions from his Government.

Ambassador NOMURA's dispatch containing these important representations by Mr. Hull and the contents of the plan (tentatively called the Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding), which was to provide the basis for the conversations, was received at the Tokyo Foreign Office between the afternoon of April 17th and the morning of the 18th. Since Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA was then in Siberia on his way home from his visit to Europe, Mr. OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 11 A. M. on the 18th, brought the first section of the dispatch to me while I was in a Cabinet conference. At 4:30 P. M. on the same day, after waiting for the cable to be decoded, he called on me at my official residence, accompanied by Mr. TERASAKI, Chief of the American Bureau.

This Proposal for Understanding was to announce, in the form of a joint declaration, an agreement between the two Governments on several fundamental items necessary for breaking the deadlock between the two countries. Detailed agreements were to be arranged by a Japanese-American conference to follow the joint declaration.

[2] The following seven items are those concerning which the two Governments were to establish mutual understanding:

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan.
2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.
3. The relationship of the two countries to the China Incident.

4. Matters pertaining to the Naval strength, air strength and shipping of the two countries in the Pacific.
5. Trade and monetary agreements between the two countries.
6. Economic activity of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific.
7. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific.

From the Japanese point of view, the vital points of the Proposal for Understanding were the prevention of the spread of the European War to the Pacific, the termination of the China Incident, and the promotion of economic co-operation between America and Japan.

[3]

## II

In view of the importance of the matter, I summoned a joint conference of high government and military leaders for 8 o'clock that very night.

The Government was represented by the Premier, the Home Minister, the War and Navy Ministers and also by Mr. OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs represented the Supreme Command. Also present were the Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the War and Navy Ministries, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The consensus of opinion regarding the American proposal was as follows:

1. Acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward disposal of the China Incident. That is to say, no effective results had been obtained by the setting-up of the Wang Regime, direct negotiations with Chungking were becoming more difficult, and Chungking was entirely dependent upon America; consequently negotiations with Chungking were possible only through the good offices of America. In view of these facts it was quite clear that acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward disposal of the China Incident.

2. To accede to this proposal and to plan for a rapprochement between the two countries would not only provide the best means of avoiding a Japanese-American war, but would also be a prerequisite to preventing the European war from assuming the magnitude of a world war and to the creation of world peace.

3. The considerable depletion of Japan's national strength made it desirable to restore and cultivate that strength by disposing of the China Incident as quickly as possible. For the success of Japan's southward advance which was being advocated in certain quarters, the supreme command itself confessed to having neither the confidence of success nor the necessary preparation. The cultivation of national strength, moreover, necessitated the temporary restoration of amicable relations with America and planning for the replenishment of the supply of vital commodities for the future.

Thus, the participants were in favor of accepting the American proposal. However, the following items were brought forth as conditions of acceptance.

1. It should be made clear that there would be no infringement of the Tripartite Pact. This was considered axiomatic in view of Japan's keeping faith with Germany.

[4] 

2. It should be made more clear that the object of Japanese American cooperation was the promotion of world peace. If the understanding between the two countries were to relieve America of her commitments in the Pacific and thus afford her an opportunity for increasing her support of Britain, Japan would be breaking faith with Germany, which would be improper, and it would constitute a lowering of the tone of the whole concept of the proposal.

3. The contents of the proposal were too complex.

4. Since the text gives the impression of a return to the old world order, clearer expression should be given to the constructive side of the proposal, namely, the idea of building a New Order.

5. Speedy action was necessary to avoid the probable leakage of intelligence. For this reason the return of the Foreign Minister to Japan must be urged.

There were the following two opinions as to whether or not this affair should be reported to Germany.

1. Fidelity demanded that Germany be informed of a matter of such importance as this. She should be informed at least prior to Japan's answer being given to America.

2. If Germany were informed before the fact, she might express her opposition. Since this might vitiate the success of the desired conversations, they should be kept secret from Germany while negotiations were in progress.

[5]

## III

After the joint conference on the 18th, the Army, Navy and Foreign Office immediately started examination of the proposal. In the meantime, TERASAKI, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, wished to cable instructions to Ambassador NOMURA to transmit to America Japan's "acceptance in principle" of the proposal. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs OHASHI, although in favor of the idea, vetoed it; he insisted that the answer be dispatched after the Foreign Minister's return. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA finally reached Dairen on the 20th, and I got in touch with him by telephone. It was learned later that the Foreign Minister then said to persons close to him, "The American proposal has probably come as the fruit of what I said in Moscow to Mr. Steinhart, the American Ambassador to Soviet Russia". In fact, the Foreign Minister on his way, both to and from Europe, had held conversations in Moscow with Mr. Steinhart, an old acquaintance, asking him to urge President Roosevelt, if the latter was really fond of gambling, to have faith in Japan and to lend a helping hand for the sake of Sino-Japanese peace. MATSUOKA had reported this to me by cable under the date of April 8th, and apparently had been secretly expecting his move to bear fruit.

Because of adverse weather, the Foreign Minister was delayed a day, returning to Tokyo on April 22nd. Since a joint conference had been scheduled for the very evening of his arrival, the examination of the American proposal, by the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, had been roughly completed on the 21st. In addition, the Army and Navy held a joint conference that same day at the Navy Club, the respective Ministers and Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Sections participating, and presented a memorandum to me which stated that "Japan must turn the American scheme to good advantage and by embracing the principles embodied in the proposal, attain the objectives of the China Incident, restore the national strength, and thereby attain a powerful voice in the establishment of world peace".

I went to Tachikawa airfield to meet the Foreign Minister personally. Realizing the significance of MATSUOKA's first glimpse of the American proposal, since he is an extraordinarily sensitive man, I had intended to explain the proposal to him in the automobile on the way back to Tokyo. However, MATSUOKA had already planned to pay homage at the Imperial Palace at Niju Bashi, so Vice Foreign Minister OHASHI rode in MATSUOKA's car in my place, and to OHASHI was entrusted the delicate task of discussing the American Proposal. I was told afterward, that as expected, the Foreign Minister was extremely annoyed and showed no interest whatever. At the joint conference held after his return, MATSUOKA talked endlessly about his European trip, and when the conversation turned to the American proposal, he showed signs of excitement and laid special emphasis upon the question of keeping faith with Germany.

[6] He said that he interpreted the American proposal as being 70% ill-will and 30% good-will. He recalled that America had entered the first World War after safeguarding her interests in the Pacific by concluding the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, and had scrapped the agreement after the war without regard for the difficult task which had been imposed upon Japan during the period of hostilities. MATSUOKA asked for two weeks' time to ponder the question and left at 11 P. M. ahead of everyone else. The conference continued until 1:30 the next morning, the participants agreeing to proceed with the matter as far as possible, regardless of MATSUOKA's opinion.

When on the 23rd, I summoned the Foreign Minister alone for an informal conference at my official residence, he seemed to have regained a certain degree of calm as compared with the preceding day. The only thing that he said, however, was "Let me pass judgment after my experiences in Europe have worn off".

In the meantime, ill-feeling toward the Foreign Minister increased among Army and Navy leaders. Among these were some who in their anger demanded that resolute steps be taken, even at the cost of changing the Foreign Minister. I, being familiar with MATSUOKA's complex nature, however, was aware that there was no other way than to let him alone for the time being. The next day, I took to my bed with a cold and remained confined to my OGIKUBO home until May 1st. The Foreign Minister, too, for about the same period, spent his days in recuperating from an illness. During this time, the Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries called on the Foreign Minister jointly and separately, exerting their utmost efforts to soothe his feelings, so that

Japan's answer might be sent to America as soon as possible. However, the Foreign Minister, either on the pretext of illness, or for the reason of his disagreement with the contents of Japan's answer to the American proposal, was difficult to move from his position.

[7]

## IV

There was no denying, however, that despite his outward demeanor, the Foreign Minister was giving concentrated thought to the handling of the problems then pending between America and Japan. It was learned later that on his sick-bed Matsuoka had been closely examining both the text of the American proposal and the revision of the same which had been drawn up by the appropriate authorities of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries. In addition, he was also thoroughly revising the latter. A third joint conference was finally held on May 3rd.

Those participating in the conference approved, on the whole, of the revised proposal prepared by the Foreign Minister. The main points of the revision were the elimination of Item IV, "Naval Strength, Air Strength and Shipping of the two countries in the Pacific"; the insertion of a new clause under Item "2", "Attitudes of the two countries toward the European War", covering the mediation of Japan and America between Britain and Germany; and clear definitions of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Other points were the withholding of the announcement of the China Incident peace terms, the deletion of Japan's declaration not to carry on a southward military advance, and the deletion of the agreement concerning Japanese-American conversations. (See Appendix II).

Although the demand to submit the revised plan immediately to the Americans was overwhelming, Foreign Minister Matsuoka stubbornly maintained that the conclusion of a neutrality treaty should be proposed to the United States as a test. His point was finally approved.

The next point was whether or not the Germans should be informed of the entire matter. Different points of view were expressed on this matter also. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister demanded that the whole affair be entrusted to his own diplomatic ability, and so it was left entirely to his discretion.

After the conference adjourned, the Foreign Minister dispatched two telegraphic instructions to Ambassador Nomura. The first was a tentative reply to the American proposal, and was in the form of an oral statement addressed to Secretary Hull by the Foreign Minister. The gist of this statement was that the German and Italian leaders were absolutely confident about the outcome of the European War; that American participation in the war would serve only to prolong hostilities, and thereby bring about the downfall of world civilization; and that Japan could never act in any way injurious to the position of her allies; Germany and Italy. The other dispatch instructed Ambassador Nomura to propose as his personal idea a simple and clear-cut Japanese American neutrality treaty.

Before the Foreign Minister left Tokyo on May 4th to visit the Ise Shrine, he instructed Sakamoto, Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, to inform in strict confidence both the German and Italian Ambassadors that a secret proposal for the readjustment of Japanese-American relations [8] had been made by the American Government; that the Japanese Government had made the above-mentioned tentative reply; and that it had proposed a neutrality treaty. When the Foreign Minister returned to Tokyo on May 6th, he himself inquired whether "Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had any opinions", and he further stated that it would be ultimately profitable to Germany to turn to America's ill-intentioned proposal to good advantage and terminate the China incident.

Meanwhile, in Washington, Ambassador Nomura and other members of the Embassy were growing impatient at the delay in Japan's submission of a reply to America. Having received the tentative instruction from Foreign Minister Matsuoka, the Ambassador had an interview with Secretary Hull on the 7th and sounded out his opinion regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty. However, Mr. Hull showed no interest whatever. Later, Ambassador Nomura discovered that the American Government authorities, although they might be interested after the conclusion of the Proposal for Understanding, were not at all interested in concluding a neutrality treaty at this stage of the negotiations. As for the oral statement, the Ambassador refrained from transmitting the document to Mr. Hull, lest the feelings of the Americans be antagonized. He

did not even read the document in its entirety to Mr. Hull. It was said that during the interview, Mr. Hull in a tone unusually strong for him, urged commencement of the negotiations themselves as speedily as possible. Thus, Foreign Minister Matsuoka's test plan failed to produce its desired effect. Also, American domestic conditions were rapidly becoming more difficult, particularly in view of the National Defense Act and convoy problems. Ambassador Nomura repeatedly urged the Japanese Government to reply. He also reported that he had held in check the American demands insisted upon from the beginning, namely, the establishment of four basic principles: 1) Preservation of territorial integrity and respect for national sovereignty; 2) Non-interference with domestic issues; 3) Establishment of the equality principle, including equal commercial opportunity; and 4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific, with the exception of changes in present conditions through peaceful means, by proposing to keep at a minimum discussions involving principles, and to give precedence to a Japanese-American understanding which would be actual and effective. His report emphasized that an impatient demand by Japan at this time for recognition of the New Order and for mediation in the European War would be more harmful than beneficial. The Japanese Military and Naval Attaches in Washington, furthermore, sent to Japan a statement of their opposition to Matsuoka, terming his policy "gesture diplomacy". On the other hand, the Military Attache in Berlin sent a cable to the War Minister to the effect that it was known from reliable sources that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations with America, that his office was completely opposed to such negotiations, and that, depending upon circumstances, his whole office might submit their resignations. This might be regarded as one repercussion to having informed German and Italy of the Japanese-American negotiations.

[9]

## V

As the situation became more confused and complicated, the activity of the Cabinet members concerned grew more intense. On May 8th, the Foreign Minister was received in audience by the Emperor and informed him that in case America should enter the war, Japan must stand by Germany and Italy. In such an eventuality, the readjustment of Japanese-American relations would be brought to nothing. In any case, if Japan were to break faith with Germany and Italy by inclining too much toward American problems, he, the Foreign Minister, would be obliged to resign. This the Foreign Minister himself reported to me on the 9th.

On the same night, I secretly summoned the Army and Navy Ministers to my house at OGIKUBO, and we held an informal discussion as to the best way of dealing with the Foreign Minister's attitude. We agreed that thereafter the Army and Navy should remain in close contact with me concerning the attitude to be taken by our country if America entered the war, and concerning what measures were to be used if Germany opposed or demanded revision of the Japanese-American negotiation.

When on the following day, May 10th, I was received in audience by the Emperor, he revealed to me, with the air of great concern, the substance of the Foreign Minister's report on the previous day. The Foreign Minister had informed the Emperor that if America were to enter the European War, Japan would have to attack Singapore; and that since America's participation would result in a prolongation of the war, there might be the danger of a German-Soviet collision. In such an eventuality Japan would have to abrogate the neutrality treaty, stand by Germany, and advance at least as far as Irkutsk. I advised the Emperor not to be concerned, since the Foreign Minister's utterances represented only one possible plan under the worst eventuality, and even if the Foreign Minister held such opinions, the military high command would have to take part in, and the Cabinet would have to be consulted about, any final decision. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I advised the Throne that for the settlement of the China Incident, which was proving to be the most urgent matter at present, making use of America was the only way, that the present American proposal was the best and only opportunity, and that I would exert all my efforts toward furthering it. I further explained in detail the difference of opinion among Cabinet members and the split in public opinion that might occur in the event of: (1) Germany's signifying her opposition; (2) America's further revising the Japanese revisions, and; (3) America's participation in the war after a Japanese-American understanding had been reached. I assured the Emperor of my resolve to do my best

to reach an amicable settlement, though if that were impossible, it might be necessary to use emergency measures. The Emperor acquiesced in all that I had said and ordered me to proceed according to the policies I had described. Upon consulting with Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I learned that the [10] Foreign Minister's reasoning had become so flighty after his visit to Europe that he had lost the Emperor's confidence. In fact, on the 8th, after receiving the Foreign Minister in audience, the Emperor had gone so far as to consider the advisability of changing the Foreign Minister.

[11]

## VI

The German reply did not come. Meanwhile in spite of urging by both myself and the Army and Navy, the Foreign Minister postponed from day to day the presentation to America of the Japanese revised proposal decided upon on May 3rd. Pressed by the necessity of being in time for the American President's speech scheduled for May 14th, however, the Foreign Minister, on May 12th, without waiting for the German reply, cabled instructions to Ambassador NOMURA, authorizing him to start negotiations according to the revised proposal cabled on the previous day.

Ambassador NOMURA, in compliance with the belated instructions, called upon Secretary Hull on May 11th and 12th (May 12th and 13th) (Japanese time), and offered an explanation of the Japanese revised proposal. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, on May 13th, again sent a message to Secretary Hull. He laid stress upon the point that the two premises motivating Japan's decision regarding the conversations with America were: (1) America's non-participation in the European War, and; (2) America's agreeing at an early date to advise Chiang Kai-shek to open peace negotiations with Japan. Secretary Hull called upon Ambassador NOMURA to "talk frankly about everything, since the Japanese-American conversations now in progress are not negotiations conducted upon a definite basis, but are unofficial and free talks". Concerning the Japanese revised proposal, which had been handed to him by the Ambassador, he expressed not a little doubt concerning the Japanese deletion of the clause insuring Japan's armed invasion of the Southern regions. He showed special concern over the clause covering the China Incident and asked various questions. He remarked significantly that concerning this matter America would have to consult with Britain. Further, his explanation that American domestic conditions were not at all such as to make conversations with Japan easy, showed that he was proceeding with the utmost caution. More than this, the President's speech which had been scheduled for the 14th was postponed until the 29th, and American public opinion was excited about the issue of convoys. It was apparent that, pressed by international and domestic issues, America was finding it difficult to determine its attitude. At any rate, contrary to Japanese expectations, the American answer was slow in coming.

[12]

## VII

It was because Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had wished to receive a German reply before submitting his reply to Washington that he had caused the delay in dispatching the Japanese revised proposal. His efforts had been unavailing, and he had been able to wait no longer. Immediately after the instructions had been sent to Ambassador NOMURA on May 12th, the German reply arrived. The gist of the reply was that, since America's underlying motive in planning conciliation with Japan apparently was that she wished to enter the war against Germany, it was desirable that the Japanese Government make it clear to the American Government that: (1) the patrolling and convoying being carried on by America was recognized as an act deliberately provocative of war, and one which would inevitably cause Japan to enter the war, and that; (2) if America refrained from such actions, Japan would be ready to study the American proposal. Furthermore, the German reply ended with the request that, in view of the effect of the present negotiations upon the Tripartite Pact, Germany be consulted before a final answer is sent to America. The Italian Government sent a communication to the effect that Italy's reply was the same as the German's.

Subsequently, on May 19th, as was more or less expected, Ambassador Ott made representations concerning the displeasure of his Government with Japan's having replied to America without waiting for the German reply. The German representations, by implication, expressed Germany's objection in principle to

the Japanese-American negotiations, and pointed out that any treaty concluded by any one of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact with a third country would weaken the common front of the Tripartite Pact signatories. The reply requested that at least "The American Government's obligation not to interfere with the war between England and the Axis countries" and "Japan's obligations accruing from the Tripartite Pact" be clearly defined. Lastly, the representations stated that "The German Government was obliged to express its desire for total participation by Germany in the Japanese-American negotiations and for an immediate report regarding the American reply. It constituted an infringement upon the articles of the Tripartite Pact for Japan to listen to American representations and to determine Japan's future policy without entering into a previous understanding with the German Government regarding all the important problems included in the proposal." Such were the high-handed representations of the Germans. At the same time Ambassador OSHIMA repeatedly sent cables, reporting that German national leaders were harboring extreme antipathy toward the Japanese-American proposal. He also declared his own opposition in strong language.

[13]

## VIII

In Tokyo, joint conferences were held on May 15th and May 22nd, but they did not go beyond an exchange of information and opinions. It was evident that through the influence of the German representations and the repeated objections of Ambassador OSHIMA, the originally vague attitude of the Foreign Minister had become more and more vague; and it was more and more obvious that, in contrast with the other Cabinet members who were full of hopes, he was standing alone in his opposition. For instance, following the conference on the 22nd, Chief Cabinet Secretary TOMITA was asked by OKA, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry to transmit to the Premier the request that he "take into consideration a possible split among Cabinet members in the event of the establishment of an agreement, were the Foreign Minister to continue to hold such a contrary point of view."

On the other hand, the Foreign Minister had an interview with me on the 23rd, in which he argued strongly that "although it appeared that Army and Navy leaders were trying to have the Japanese-American understanding put through, even at the cost, more or less of disloyalty to Germany and Italy,—what could be accomplished by such a weak-kneed attitude?"

Concerning the interpretation of Article III of the Tripartite Pact, the Foreign Minister yielded not an inch in his stand that even if American convoys were attacked by the Germans, Japan would be obliged to enter the war and help the Germans, convoying itself being regarded as attack. In fact, the Foreign Minister frequently, in a half-threatening manner, stressed this point upon Ambassador Grew, thinking that this might just possibly prevent America's entry into the war. However, the American President was apparently determined to enter the war, and if that should happen, the Japanese-American understanding would be useless. Under such circumstances the nation would never be satisfied with an attitude such as the Army and Navy's present one, and a national uprising might ensue. At all events, Japan would have to clarify its stand, and come out for England and America, or for Germany and Italy. He took the stand that as Foreign Minister he must insist on union with Germany and Italy to the very last. Later, by saying that "as a subject there was no other course than to obey the Emperor's wishes," he by implication indicated the possibility of resignation.

Although it was possible to suspect from the Foreign Minister's words and actions that he might have made some serious commitments while he was in Germany, there was no alternative to putting faith in his report. According to it, both Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had urged that Japan attack Singapore, but he (MATSUOKA) had said nothing to commit himself. However, according to a cable from Ambassador OSHIMA, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had said "Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's personal view, at the time that he came to Germany, that Singapore would be attacked [4] seems to be entirely changed." The problem remained as to what was the truth. At any rate, it was extremely difficult to comprehend the Foreign Minister's actual intentions, pressed as he was between the American question on one side and loyalty to Germany and Italy on the other.

At about this time the Foreign Minister began to express frankly his displeasure and animosity toward Ambassador NOMURA. At an interview with me on May 23rd, he angrily declared that "it was clear that the present proposal was not made by the Americans but was initiated by Ambassador NOMURA." In spite of my explanation that the Foreign Minister was mistaken in his surmise, he continued to censure the Ambassador's "going beyond his powers". When it became more and more clear that the proposal was not at least the fruit of the Foreign Minister's own labors with Steinhart, he seemed to be extremely displeased. Further, according to a cable which Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to Washington, sent back to London, and which was intercepted by the Navy, Ambassador NOMURA had said to Secretary Hull that in Japan, the Emperor, and the governmental and Army and Navy authorities were all desirous of the success of the present undertaking; the Foreign Minister alone being opposed to it. When the Foreign Minister saw this, he became very angry, and sent a telegram rebuking Ambassador NOMURA for the above statement which he (MATSUOKA) had "received from a reliable source". He also ordered NOMURA to "correct the Secretary's misunderstanding immediately". Ambassador NOMURA immediately replied by cable, saying that he "was completely surprised, and that the accusation was totally unfounded on fact". It also said that "the only thing he could have said bearing on the situation was in answer to Hull's question in which he had replied that in Japan, diplomatic policies could not be decided by the Foreign Minister alone". In reply the Foreign Minister cabled back, "that is good, but if there are any persons in America giving such an impression, take the proper steps." This reply clearly revealed the Foreign Minister's animosity towards persons who were not members of the Ambassador's staff but who were close to him.

Though the issue was resolved for the time being, the opposition between the Foreign Minister on the one hand, and Ambassador NOMURA and his followers on the other, had already come out into the open.

[15]

## IX

On May 14th, 16th, 20th, 21st and 28th, Ambassador Nomura held successive conversations with Secretary Hull "in an atmosphere of amity". They were "private conversations of from one to two hours, off the record," and did not appear to go further than to discuss back and forth the following subjects: the form of an agreement which was to cover the whole Pacific, the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese problem. From the Secretary of State's utterances and from inside information, the real facts seemed to be that America was suspicious of the sincerity of Japan's intention to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion, and in particular was taking careful note of the uncompromising attitude of such people as Foreign Minister Matsuoka. President Roosevelt gave his fireside chat on May 27th, with the whole world listening attentively. He made no direct reference to Japan, and touched but lightly on Chinese affairs. There was also information that the President had given special attention to relations with Japan. These things together seemed to reflect a cautious attitude on the part of America and at the same time to offer material for hope concerning Japanese-American negotiations. However, on the 29th, the *Washington Times-Herald* printed an account by Henning, the Chicago Tribune's Washington correspondent, exposing the inside story of the Japanese-American negotiations. According to this story, the President prior to his fireside chat, had summoned Congressional leaders, and had revealed that America's policy was to concentrate upon entering the war with Germany, while pursuing a policy of appeasement toward Japan. The President was quoted as having said that "in Japan, the opposition of financial interests to the policy of the military would gather strength to the point where the Tripartite Pact would be virtually nullified". This story was immediately banned in Tokyo, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on the contrary, insisted that it be published, and on the 30th made public his statement of "refutation" which emphasized the absolute unchangeableness of Japan's Axis diplomacy, and the existence of a limit to the peaceful southern advance policy.

[16]

## X

I left on a trip westward on June 13th, and after fulfilling previous engagements at the Helan Shrine in Kyoto and at the Omi Shrine, I returned to Tokyo on the 16th. On the following day, the 17th, President Wang Ching-wei of the Nanking Government arrived on a visit to Tokyo. Until he left on the 25th, I



had to devote a good deal of time to his entertainment. Meanwhile, on the morning of the 22nd, to the utter consternation of the world, the German-Soviet War broke out. To make matters worse, by co-incidence the American reply had been handed to Ambassador Nomura on the previous day, June 21st, and was transmitted to Tokyo on the 24th. The Cabinet was now forced to concentrate its entire attention upon the development of the serious matter of the German-Soviet War.

As soon as Foreign Minister Matsuoka received word of the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, he immediately gained audience with the Emperor. He advised the Emperor that "now that the German-Soviet War had started Japan, too, must cooperate with Germany and attack Russia. To do this, it was better for the time being to refrain from action in the south. Sooner or later Japan would have to fight there. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets, America and England simultaneously. Of course, the Foreign Minister had not consulted with the Cabinet. This was his independent action. The Emperor was greatly astonished, and ordered him to "consult with the Premier immediately". At the same time, through Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Emperor informed me of the contents of the Foreign Minister's advice. In compliance with the Imperial order, the Foreign Minister called on me at my Ogikubo residence at ten o'clock the same night. What he said was not very clear, but in short it appeared that the Foreign Minister had conveyed to the Emperor his own personal forecast of the situation at its worst. Upon seeing the Emperor on the 23rd, I tried to relieve his concern by saying that such was the nature of the Foreign Minister's advice. It was not clear whether the Foreign Minister's "uncomprising attitude" was nothing more than his own personal forecast, or whether it was a conviction. Therefore, for fear of further complications, I telephoned from the Imperial Palace to the Chief Cabinet Secretary to postpone the joint conference to consider the German-Soviet question which was scheduled to begin that same afternoon. It was learned that in addition to his statement to the Emperor, the Foreign Minister had made not a few similar statements to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and to various private persons, and had caused quite a stir. A searching investigation by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and myself disclosed that the Foreign Minister's claims appeared to be that "First, we must attack the Soviets. Although we must try to avoid war with America, in the event that America does enter the war, we must fight her too." Even though that was the Foreign Minister's opinion, I held informal conversations with the Army and Navy Ministers to determine the Government's attitude. In addition, I summoned joint conferences in quick succession on June 25th, 26th, 28th and 30th, and July 1st. Finally, I requested the convening of a council in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd, where it was decided that for the time being Japan would not undertake action against the Soviets. (See Appendix III).

[17]

## XI

America showed a profound interest in Japan's attitude toward the German-Soviet War. On July 4th, the President had the Secretary of State send a message to me directly, which said that "We have information that Japan is starting military operations against the Soviets. We request assurance that this is contrary to fact." This message was delivered to me on July 6th by Ambassador Grew. This procedure was unprecedented, and showed how seriously the American Government held Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in disfavor. I conferred with the Foreign Minister, and on the 8th he submitted to Ambassador Grew, in place of an answer, a copy of the communication to the Soviet Government (handed to Soviet Ambassador Smetany on July 2nd). Turning the occasion to advantage, I inquired whether "The American Government really intended to enter the European War." The American answer to this question arrived on July 16th, the day of the resignation of the Cabinet. This answer was bitterly ironical, saying that "it was quite proper to exercise the right of self-defense against Germany" and that "any country using force to keep America an indifferent bystander would be considered a partisan of the countries conducting armed invasion." Foreign Minister MATSUOKA at once disposed of this reply by expressing his opposition to unlimited abuse of the right of self-defense. Also, the Foreign Minister evinced considerable displeasure at the direct and secret transmission of the message to me. Whereupon Ambassador Grew could hardly hide his disappointment in having had a direct interview with me blocked. After this relationships between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, which had always been cool, grew increasingly worse.

With the German-Soviet question settled for the time being, the American question permitted of no more delay. Also, the Foreign Minister's ambiguous attitude could no longer be disregarded. Consequently, on July 4th, purposely using the form of a letter, I transmitted the following views to the Foreign Minister.

1. Until the settlement of the Northern question, armed force should not be used against the Southern regions, and steps should be taken toward readjustment of diplomatic relations with America. Naval leaders clearly state that to fight America and the Soviets simultaneously offers almost insurmountable difficulties. From this point of view it is advisable that the invasion of French Indo-China should, if possible, be abandoned.

2. As a result of the readjustment of diplomatic relations with America, it would be impossible to satisfy German demands. This might temporarily create an undercurrent of misunderstanding among the Axis countries, but this could not be avoided.

3. Readjustment of American-Japanese relations was also necessary in view of these three points:

- a. Expansion of national strength by acquisition of foreign goods.
- b. Prevention of American-Soviet reapproachment.
- c. Acceleration of peace negotiations with Chungking.

4. Not only was it necessary to continue the present negotiations with America, from the above point of view—it was also necessary to bring them to a successful conclusion, in the light of high national policies. Lastly, I added that “even though from the Foreign Minister's point of view a compromise between Japan and America might seem impossible, I, who carried the responsibility of vital state affairs, was obliged to do my best. Moreover, the Emperor was seriously concerned about the situation. I, therefore was determined to do my utmost, and would work for the success of negotiations even at the cost of some concessions.”

The Foreign Minister said to me over the telephone that he was profoundly moved by my letter. When he saw me at my official residence the next day, the 5th, the following points were established.

“Fundamentally he was of the same mind as I. No matter what public opinion might be, he considered himself to be the most zealous person in respect to the American question. He was certainly not trying to please Germany. However, he was opposed to do anything detrimental to the Tripartite Pact. From that very day he was going to give his entire attention to the American Question.” At the same time, he made the significant statement that [19] “if at any time he became a stumbling-block, he would resign his post.”

## XIII

[20] Deliberations on the Japanese-American Proposal for Understanding thus began again. Joint conferences were held on July 10th and 12th, which considered the American proposal of June 21st. The special points of this June 21st proposal were as follows:

1. In the item covering the attitudes of the two countries toward the European War, the clause advocated by Japan, which proposed joint efforts of Japan and America for the restoration of peace, was deleted. This suggested by implication a determination to work to the last for the overthrow of Germany.

2. In relation to the Tripartite Pact, America proposed that “Japan . . . make clear her intention of preventing a spreading of the European War resulting from provocative acts. This seemed to reveal an effort to have Japan make a written promise not to take up arms in the event of America's participation in the war as the result of “provocation” by Germany.

3. Concerning the China Incident, the distinction made in the first proposal between the Chiang Kai-shek Administration and the Nanking Government was omitted so as to make the recommendation of peace be to the “Chinese Government”. Also, although the Konoye Principles were mentioned, only that part referring to amicable relations were included, and the matter of economic cooperation and a common front against communism was omitted. On the whole this marked a general reversion to a fear of American public opinion.

4. The Sino-Japanese Peace Terms, which Japan had deleted were included in an Annex. The necessity for the establishment of perfect agreement concerning this was indicated.

5. Whereas Japan advocated limiting the economic cooperation of Japan and America to the "southwest" Pacific, this was revised to cover the entire Pacific. (See Appendix IV)

Further, an oral statement was attached to the proposal. It attempted to sound out Japan's true intentions, saying that "America was ardently hoping for the realization of Japanese-American understanding, and would like to receive more clearly than it had up to this time assurances that the Japanese Government too was desirous of this realization as a whole. In one section it was mentioned that intelligence had been received that "among Japanese leaders in influential positions were those who had pledged themselves to further the demands of National Socialist Germany and its subjugation policies". In saying that under these circumstances the understanding between the two countries, presently being deliberated, might end in "disillusionment", the oral statement by implication censured Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. It also expressed doubts concerning [21] the stationing of Japanese troops in China.

This June 21st proposal was finally deliberated upon at the joint conference of July 10th.

However, in spite of my efforts, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude became increasingly uncooperative. It became clear that his attitude was one of opposition to the Japanese-American negotiations. During the joint conference of July 10th, he especially requested the presence of Dr. Yoshie SAITO, Advisor to the Foreign Ministry and MATSUOKA's confidential friend, and through him opened up a general attack upon the Japanese-American negotiations. He even distributed to those who participated in the conference, previously prepared leaflets expressing his views. These leaflets contained points almost the same as those of his spoken agreement, and might briefly be summed up as follows: The American proposal, from beginning to end, was based upon ill-will, which wanted to subjugate Japan or throw her into utter confusion. The Foreign Minister was particularly incensed over the suspicion cast upon his attitude, by implication, in the oral statement attached to the American proposal. This was a demand for a Cabinet change which would change the Foreign Minister, and constituted an interference in domestic affairs. Such a thing was unprecedented in diplomatic history since the time when the German Kaiser demanded the resignation of the French Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister's concluding statement was that, at the very least, the oral statement should be sent back at once, and that the Japanese-American negotiations should be broken off, the when and how of this being now the only questions. Troubled by the uncompromising attitude of the Foreign Minister, I held a secret conference that night with the Army, Navy and Home Ministers.

At the joint conference on the 12th, the Army and Navy made a joint statement of their opinions. It differed from the Foreign Minister's in that it stated: (1) Japan's attitude toward the European War should be determined according to treaty obligations and the question of self-defense. (2) The three Konoye Principles should form the basis of dealing with the Chinese question. America might make recommendations as to an armistice and peace, but should not intervene in the peace terms. (3) Japan reserved her right to use armed forces in the Pacific in case of necessity.

It was thought necessary to define these three points clearly for the sake of the future. In other respects the American proposal was all right. However, even in the eventuality of a breakdown in negotiations matters should be prolonged until after the entrance of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.

Ultimately Foreign Minister MATSUOKA agreed to draw up the Japanese counter-proposal on the basis of the Army and Navy views. On the 12th, [22] after the end of the conference, MUTA and OKA, Directors of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries, respectively; TERASAKI, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office; TOMITA, Chief Cabinet Secretary; and SAITO, Foreign Office Advisor, met in conference and drew up Japan's final draft proposal.

There remained to obtain Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's agreement. In spite of strong Army and Navy pressure, the Foreign Minister, under pretext of illness, would not read the draft proposal. His seeing the German Ambassador and others in the meantime, however, angered the Army and Navy. Finally, on the 14th, the Foreign Minister listened to Dr SAITO's explanation, and the final proposal including the Foreign Minister's revised opinions was drawn up. This affair lasted only a day or two, but there was tense atmosphere in the government, and an added strain was felt in political circles.

The Japanese counter-proposal, which was drawn up according to the Foreign Minister's revision, differed from the American proposal of June 21st, chiefly in the following points:

1. To facilitate American acceptance the phrase "when the proper occasion arises" was added to the clause covering a joint effort by Japan and America to be exerted for the speedy termination of the European War.
2. The paragraph concerning the Tripartite Pact was revised to read "if by mischance the European War spreads, the Japanese Government shall execute its obligations under the Pact and determine its attitude solely according to consideration of national welfare and safety."
3. In the section pertaining to the Chinese question, the Konoye Principles were set forth as a whole, and the term "Nanking Government", which was disliked by America, was avoided. However, it was clearly stated that the American Government was to advise Chiang Kai-shek to make peace.
4. Sino-Japanese peace terms were again omitted.
5. For the reason that it was in the Southwest Pacific that Japanese-American cooperation was particularly needed, the "whole Pacific area" was changed to "Southwest Pacific."

When the Japanese counter-proposal was finally drawn up, everyone concerned was of the opinion that it should be sent to America immediately. However, the Foreign Minister clung to the opinion that "First of all, instructions rejecting the oral statement, and then two or three days later, the counter-proposal should be cabled. [23] The cabled instructions rejecting the oral statement termed it "an impolite and improper document", and indicated that "unless the American Government first withdrew it, Japan would be unable to proceed with deliberation on the Proposal for Understanding."

I, and the Army and Navy, strongly urged that at least the Japanese counter-proposal should be dispatched at the same time as the cabled instructions, since the latter by itself would only stir up ill feelings on the other side, and might lead to a rupture. However, late on the night of the 14th, the Foreign Minister, in disregard of an agreement with me and Dr SAITO, sent the cabled instructions of rejection alone. (Actually, Secretary Hull, surprised at the interpretation which had been given to it, withdrew it on July 17th, in order to clear away the misunderstanding). On the following day, the 15th, the Foreign Minister ordered SAKAMOTO, the Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, to inform the Germans secretly of Japan's last proposal which had not yet been presented even to America.

[24]

## XIV

Upon arriving at this state of affairs, the Cabinet was of one mind with me that it could no longer deal with important diplomatic matters. So, on the 15th, after a Cabinet council from which the Foreign Minister was absent, I consulted with the Home, Army and Navy Ministers as to the best course available. The Army Minister declared that "realizing the various undesirable consequences which would ensue from the dismissal of the Foreign Minister, he had done his utmost to cooperate with him, but now it was no longer possible." At this point, there was nothing else for it but the Foreign Minister's dismissal, or the resignation of the Cabinet en masse. Four Ministers were agreed upon this point. However, should the Foreign Minister alone be dismissed, extremely serious consequences might follow, in view of the fact that the Foreign Minister had emphatically stated that "the American oral statement was a demand for a Cabinet change". At this time, it was decided that, quite apart from the Foreign Minister's attitude or the American question, and quite simply, from the viewpoint of the consolidation of the wartime structure, it would be better for the Cabinet to resign en masse.

The council broke up with the decision to have a consultation again the next day.

When I reported these circumstances to the Emperor at two o'clock that afternoon at his Hayama residence, the Emperor asked "whether or not it was possible to dismiss Matsuoka alone". I replied that I would do the best I could after careful deliberation, but that the Cabinet could not continue to exist like this. I then had an interview with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and explained the reasons why a general resignation was necessary. I suggested Home Minister Hiranuma as the best candidate for the next premiership. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, without saying whether he agreed or not, recommended that prompt action be taken.

On the following day, July 16th, in accordance with the previous day's agreement, I, the Home Minister, the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board met at noon in a secret conference at my Mejiro residence. As a result of the deliberations, we agreed upon a general resignation. Then, after all preparations had been made by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who was standing by in readiness, at half-past six an extraordinary Cabinet council was convened, and the resignations were handed over. The Foreign Minister being at home in bed, the Chief Cabinet Secretary called upon him and obtained his resignation. The Foreign Minister was taken unawares, and showed great annoyance. However, he could do nothing in the face of the general decision, and entrusted his seal to the Chief Secretary.

At 8:50 P. M. I tendered the resignations to the Emperor at his Hayama residence. At 11 P. M. I reported to the Cabinet Members. Thus the Second Konoye Cabinet came to an end.

[25]

## XV

On July 17th at 5:10 P. M. I was received in audience by the Emperor at the Imperial Palace and ordered to organize the Cabinet again. Commencing the selection of Cabinet members at once, I completed the task at 5:30 P. M. on the 18th. I reported to the Palace at 7:00 P. M. and presented the names of the Cabinet members. At 8:50 P. M. the newly-organized third Konoye Cabinet came into existence. The first Cabinet council was held at 9:45 P. M. The special feature of the new Cabinet was the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Minister.

The previous Cabinet had done its utmost for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Particularly, the Army and Navy had maintained the closest cooperation. The opposition of the Foreign Minister alone had caused the Cabinet's collapse. Unexpectedly, only the Foreign Minister was changed, and actually the identical Cabinet had the opportunity of again taking the stage. (In addition to the Foreign Minister, four Ministers, Kanemitsu, Ogawa, Akita, and Kawada had resigned, but essentially it was a matter of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's being changed.) Thus, the mission assigned to the new Cabinet was clear to everyone.

It should be noted particularly that the Army and Navy Ministers remained in office, and that the important post of Foreign Minister was occupied by a representative of the Navy, which was most concerned with the American question, and hence had a significant voice in the matter. The Cabinet was given the additional privilege of holding joint conferences with the Supreme Command in the Imperial Palace, and launched immediately upon the attainment of its objectives, the solution of Japanese-American problems.

In the first part of July, the Imperial Headquarters was established in the Imperial Palace. The joint conferences between the Government and the Supreme Command were to take place in the Palace also. On July 23rd, the first meeting for exchange of information was held in the Palace. The Army, particularly Tojo, the Army Minister, was responsible for the establishment of the Imperial Headquarters and the joint conferences in the Imperial Palace. It was thought that by this maneuver orders issued by the joint conferences within the Palace would have more weight, and that such orders in themselves would completely obviate divisions within the Cabinet or a split in public opinion. That such a hope could be fully attained was inconceivable in the light of later developments.

However, the significance of this very obvious political change was not clearly grasped by Ambassador Nomura in Washington. Because the Ambassador himself failed to understand it, almost nothing was done to convey its significance to the Americans. To the Tokyo Government, which had expected that a good impression would be made by the establishment of the new Cabinet, and that negotiations would progress *swiftly* now that the vague atmosphere had been dispelled, this situation was truly mortifying.

[26] The previous Cabinet in its last days had drawn up with great pains a Japanese counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st, and on July 25th had dispatched it by cable. In spite of this, the Embassy at Washington had not yet presented it to the Americans, first because of the change in Cabinets, second, because of fear that its contents might not be acceptable to the Americans. This was made clear in a cable from Ambassador Nomura on July 22nd.

In addition to all that, Ambassador Nomura on July 23rd, requested that he be informed of the new Cabinet's policy toward America.

While the Japanese Cabinet's strong desire to proceed with the Japanese-American negotiations had not yet even been conveyed to the Americans, the time set by the Cabinet council for dispatching troops to French Indo-China drew near, and movements of forces on the Pacific grew frequent. This could not fail to increase the doubt and anxiety of the American Government. According to a cable from Ambassador Nomura on the 24th, rumors were circulating to the effect that, 1) Future conversations would be "torpedoed" in Tokyo; 2) Japan had given our explanation to the Axis that the Japanese-American diplomatic adjustments were a strategem until preparations for a Southern invasion were completed. In Japan, too, the expression "Japanese encirclement" was increasingly used, and in journalistic circles, for the most part, there was a strong anti-American tendency far removed from the attitude of the Cabinet.

On July 21st, Under-Secretary Welles, representing Secretary Hull, who was ill, summoned Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura's representative, and warned him that "According to information, Japan appeared to be planning the occupation of French Indo-China, and that such an action would nullify previous conversations. On the 23rd, Under-Secretary Welles had a conversation with Ambassador Nomura also, in which he made serious representations to the effect that "Up to now America had exercised all possible forbearance in holding conversations with Japan, but that because of recent events, the basis of the earliest conversations had been entirely lost."

On the 24th Ambassador Nomura had a private interview with the President. At this time, the President, declaring that the question of French Indo-China constituted a fatal problem, made the following important proposals.

1. Evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China (if they have already entered), and with that as a condition,
2. A joint guarantee by Japan, America, England, Holland and China of the neutralization of French Indo-China
3. Guaranteed access to goods from French Indo-China.

[27] The Tokyo Government's announcement of the entry of troops into French Indo-China, and the American Government's announcement of the freezing of Japanese assets came simultaneously. In view of the sudden change in the situation, I ordered the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, that night, to station a special police guard at the American Embassy.

[28]

## XVI

During the period of approximately ten days between the political change and the occupation of French Indo-China, there were many happenings which were unfortunate for mutual understanding between Tokyo and Washington. It now seemed as if the Japanese-American conversations had failed utterly. However, the Cabinet, refusing to give up hope until the last, devoted its efforts to the resumption of conversations about the American President's July 24th proposal regarding French Indo-China. An elaborated form of this proposal, including the neutralization of Thailand as well as of French Indo-China, was transmitted through Under-Secretary Welles on July 31st.

In Tokyo, successive joint conferences took place on July 29th and 30th, and on August 2nd and 4th. I exerted my utmost efforts, holding informal conversations with the Navy and Foreign Ministers on the 31st, and with the Army Minister on August 1st. I also summoned Mr. Mitsuru TOYAMA and others as a move toward the conservatives. And so, at the joint conference of August 4th, a single proposal to the United States was decided upon. Although in its form this was an answer to the President's proposal, it was designed to be the key to reopening the Japanese-American conversations which had come to a standstill. The gist of the proposal was as follows:

1. Japan has no intention of sending troops further than French Indo-China, and will withdraw them from French Indo-China after the settlement of the China Incident.
2. Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.
3. America will remove her armaments in the Southwest Pacific.
4. America will cooperate in Japan's obtaining resources in the Netherlands East Indies.
5. America will act as intermediary in the direct negotiations between Japan and China, and will recognize Japan's special position in French Indo-China, even after the withdrawal of troops.

These cabled instructions were sent to Ambassador NOMURA on August 5th. On the 6th, the Ambassador conveyed them to Secretary Hull. The Americans showed no special interest, however, and made it clear that there was no room for the continuation of conversations until Japan should abandon her saber-rattling policy. Ambassador NOMURA reported that America seemed to be ready to meet any situation.

Two days later, on August 8th, Secretary Hull handed the American answer to Ambassador NOMURA. It contained no reference to the contents of the Japanese proposal. It merely pointed out that, as a reply to the President's proposal, the Japanese proposal was not to the point. It was a sharp document, repeating almost word for word the President's proposal.

## XVII

[29] During this time, I was considering every means by which to surmount the Japanese-American crisis. Finally, I made up my mind to personally meet with the President, and on the evening of August 4th, I told both the Ministers of War and of Navy about this for the first time. My words were as follows:

"1. The President of the United States has gone so far as to say that he 'wishes to leave nothing undone,' and it is our duty, I believe, to do everything that can be done. Behind the conversations which have been held between Japan and America to date, there have been various misunderstandings and differences of sentiment, and it seems that the real intentions of each are not thoroughly understood by the other. For a statesman to allow matters to develop in this manner into war could not be justified when viewed in the light of world peace. He would not be fulfilling his duties to the Emperor, who views Japanese-American relations with particular anxiety, nor to the people. If all that could be done had been done and still there is war, there can be no help for it. In such an eventuality, our minds can be made up, and the people's will determined. Although outwardly Chamberlain of England appeared to have been deceived by Hitler on his several trips to the Continent prior to the European War, it is believed that they were effective from the standpoint of solidifying the determination of the British people.

"2. In this most critical period, it is feared that the opportune moment might be missed if negotiations are carried on through Ambassador Nomura. The Prime Minister should meet personally with the President and express straightforwardly and boldly the true intentions of the Empire. If the President still does not understand, I shall, of course, be fully prepared to break off the talks and return home. It is, therefore, an undertaking which must be carried out while being fully prepared for war against America. If, after a direct meeting with the President, an understanding cannot be obtained, the people will know that a Japanese-American war could not be avoided. This would aid in consolidating their determination. The world in general, also, would be made aware that the primary factor is not aggression and invasion. It will know that great efforts were made in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific. This would be advantageous to us in that the unfavorable trend of the world's public opinion would be somewhat eased.

"3. Since the matter of the President's coming to Honolulu has already been brought up in the first Proposal for Understanding, I do not believe that having it materialize is an impossibility. It is not necessary to assume from the start that the conversations will fail. Japan will insist, of course, on the firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. American claims will be based on the provisions of the Nine-Power Pact. The contents of these are at odds with each other. However [30] America has stated that 'it is ready at any time to discuss making revisions to the Nine-Power Pact through legal means.' Japan's ideal, of course, is to bring about the firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In view of the national potential it is too much to expect this ideal to be fulfilled at once. Therefore, I do not believe that Japanese-American talks are an impossibility if they are carried out with broadmindedness.

"4. This conference must be held soon. The outlook of the German-Soviet war indicates that the peak will become apparent in about September. If, as people in some circles predict today, a stalemate is brought about, Germany's future cannot be viewed with optimism. If that does happen, the American attitude will stiffen and she will no longer entertain the thought of talking with Japan. On the other hand, even if the German-Soviet war develops favorably for Germany,

this conference would not necessarily bring about unfavorable results for Japan. Even if Germany's attitude toward Japan becomes cool, since there is no chance of a German conquest of the world or of a complete victory over Britain and America, there are many ways in which Japanese-German relations can be altered. Therefore, we need not feel much anxiety because of favorable developments for Germany in the German-Soviet War. On the contrary, in consideration of possibly unfavorable developments for Germany, it is of the utmost urgency that we reach an accord with America without a day's delay.

"5. But the problem is not merely to come to any agreement with America. The urgency, of course, must not force us to strike a submissive attitude. In other words, we shall do everything that can be done, and then if success is not attained, there is no help for it. It is my opinion that to do everything that should be done is absolutely essential from a diplomatic as well as from a domestic standpoint."

Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows:

"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting [31] with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"-Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made, the army is not necessarily in disagreement.

"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity. (2) You shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America."

The War Minister was of the opinion that "failure of this meeting is the greater likelihood." After considering the matter from all angles, the Foreign Minister concluded that "matters should be carried out expeditiously." On the morning of the 6th, immediately after the joint conference, I was granted an audience, and I conveyed my intentions to the Emperor. During the afternoon of the 7th, I was summoned to his presence and was advised: "I am in receipt of intelligence from the Navy pertaining to a general oil embargo against Japan by America. In view of this, the meeting with the President should take place as soon as possible." Instructions were despatched to Ambassador Nomura during the morning of the 7th.

The first impression made on America by even this major proposal, was discouraging. The President was absent from Washington at the time, having gone to meet with Prime Minister Churchill. Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on the 8th, and relayed the proposal to him. As stated before, however, this coincided with our receiving the American reply to Japan's proposal of August 4th. With regard to this most important new proposal, Hull's comment was: "As long as there is no change in Japan's policy, I lack confidence in relaying this proposal to the President." Ambassador Nomura did not press the matter further but suggested by telegraph that the matter be taken up in Tokyo with Ambassador Grew.

In America, the joint statement of the President and Churchill was publicly announced and subsequently the caustic Japanese press comments concerning it were reported. The attempt on Minister Hiranuma's life on the 14th was reported in a sensational manner. On the 13th, Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a note of protest enumerating the various instances in which Japan had disregarded American rights and interests in China, calmly explaining that all representations that should be made would continue to be made in the typical tradition of American diplomacy. Among American Cabinet officials with whom Ambassador Nomura came in contact, the matter was viewed with pessimism on the theory that there was no reason for [32] America to participate in



a meeting of leaders which had no chance of succeeding. Realizing the very critical situation, Ambassador Nomura met once more with Hull on the 16th, just prior to the President's return to Washington from his conference at sea. Ambassador Nomura made every effort to convey to Hull our true intentions, but as usual, Hull repeated his opposition to "military domination." At the same time, however, his attitude with regard to the meeting of the two leaders, softened somewhat and replied: "If the Ambassador is sufficiently confident, Japan's wishes may be conveyed to the White House."

[33]

## XVIII

As expected, President Roosevelt requested Ambassador Nomura to call on August 17th—in spite of its being Sunday—which was almost immediately upon his return to Washington from the conference at sea. He brought up two subjects: One was a warning against any further southward advance by force of arms, and the other was his reply to the proposal for the meeting between the leaders of the two nations. First, he expressed the appreciation of the American Government to me and to the Japanese Government for making this proposal. Then he said, "If the Japanese Government halts Japan's expansion activities and readjusts its stand; and if it desires to embark upon a program of peace in the Pacific along the lines proposed in the program and principles proposed by the United States; and if, moreover, it is able to effect such a program, the United States is prepared to reopen the unofficial preparatory discussions which were broken off in July, and every effort will then be made to select a time and place to exchange views." Thus he expressed agreement in principle. Finally: "For this purpose, it is requested that a statement concerning the present attitude and plans of the Japanese Government, with more clarity than heretofore, be submitted." Clarification of the term, "a peaceful program," showed that it included the application of the principle of equality of economic opportunity and treatment in the entire Pacific area; the voluntary and peaceful cooperation of all the nationals in the said area; the offering of assistance to any people who might be threatened; the abolition of control through military or political pressure; and the abolition of monopolistic or preferential economic rights.

The President was in high spirits throughout this Nomura-Roosevelt conference. He even went so far as to say: "As for the locale of the meeting, Hawaii is impossible from a geographical standpoint. Juneau, Alaska, would be more suitable. As for time, how about around the middle of October?"

That the President took up this matter personally without having it proceed through regular administration channels, because he was of the opinion that the matter could be settled more quickly through his personal intercession, was indicated by one Cabinet official (Walker?) who met with Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Nomura wired Tokyo: "A reply should be made before this opportunity is lost" and accompanied this with a draft of a reply to be used as reference.

In Tokyo, after the instructions had been despatched on the 7th, aside from holding joint conferences on the 9th, 13th, 14th, and the 16th, I remained in constant touch with the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers. On the 18th, Foreign Minister Toyoda invited Ambassador Grew to call and explain why the meeting between the leaders of the two nations was of the utmost importance, and requested his cooperation in having it materialize.

[34] At about this time, Captain Iwakuro and Mr. Igawa, who had been aiding Ambassador Nomura in the talks with America, returned to Japan. Captain Iwakuro was invited to attend the joint conference of the 20th, at which he described in detail the developments up to then and explained conditions in America. My relationship with the army was explained to Mr. Igawa and his good offices in clarifying the situation were requested. Minister Wakatsuki also returned and described the Japanese-American negotiations as seen from a slightly different angle, principally to Foreign Office circles.

[35]

## XIX

At the joint conference held on August 26th the Japanese Government decided upon Japan's reply to the American proposal, which was handed over to Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt on August 17th. In this reply, Japan pointed out that it was hard for Japan to accept the American Government's hitherto assumed attitude. In addition, Japan's attitude and intentions

toward the Southern Regions and the Soviet Union were clarified. Japan further declared that the program which America claimed should be applied to the entire world should, by inference, be applied to the Pacific Area, which is a part of the world. In its reply Japan also expressed her view that it was reasonable to assume that any demand which was vitally necessary for the existence of a nation should be duly accepted.

At this same joint conference held on August 26th, in addition to deciding upon her reply, the Japanese Government approved a message addressed directly from me to President Roosevelt. In this message I, freeing myself from the past business-like negotiations, discussed the Japanese-American problem from a broader point of view. I frankly stated my sincere intention of proposing an interview which would aim at tiding over the present crisis. I also expressed my hope that the interview would take place as early as possible.

On August 28th these two documents were handed personally to the President of the United States by Ambassador Nomura. After reading my message, President Roosevelt showed his appreciation by calling it a "splendid message" and expressing his hope for a three-day interview with me. Thus, although the President did not mention the date for the interview, he exhibited an unmistakable desire for such an interview with me. Compared with the President's enthusiasm, Secretary Hull, who was present at the time, took an extremely cautious attitude. On the same night Hull summoned Ambassador Nomura and emphasized America's feeling that the interview between the two Governmental heads should take the form of a ratification of matters discussed in already completed conversations. He also made clear his basic disagreement with the Japanese feeling in this matter and stressed the fact that before the interview Japan's intentions concerning the China Problem, especially that of the evacuation of Japanese troops and the right of self-defense, should be clarified more thoroughly than heretofore.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Nomura sent two reports to Tokyo on August 29th and August 30th respectively. In one report Ambassador Nomura described the optimistic air surrounding his interview with the President, and in the other report he sent word concerning Mr. Hull's pessimistic opinion. These two reports contained important suggestions for a solution of the present crucial problems. Meanwhile, Japanese Governmental circles held two different opinions, one optimistic and the other pessimistic. However, in anticipation of the meeting becoming an actuality, the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries began selecting representatives. The Japanese Foreign Office [36] seems not to have viewed very seriously the State Department's "theoretical diplomacy" as represented by Hull, and their faith in the President's "statesman-like" way of resolution seems to have grown stronger. In the joint conference held on August 30th, Foreign Minister Toyoda inclined strongly toward the optimistic point of view.

On September 3rd, President Roosevelt secretly summed Ambassador Nomura and personally handed him his reply to my message. Although the President addressed himself to me as being "very sincerely sympathetic," he showed none of his former enthusiasm. Even in his reply the President, while he used extremely polite language, avoided any clear expression indicating his consent to the proposed interview. Instead, he stated in his message that prior to the interview it would be necessary for Japan to agree upon certain basic principles. In the light of the President's message, it became clear that the State Department's opinion had become the dominant opinion. In his oral statement, President Roosevelt clearly specified the Four Principles which he had up to that time avoided bringing up. He stated that these were the basic principles upon which the conversations had been conducted up to that point. Furthermore, he said that though the Japanese reply handed to him personally on August 28th (the reply accompanying my message) seemed to have made clear its agreement with these principles, there still remained various untouched-upon and unsolved problems in respect to the June 21st American Proposal for Understanding. He argued that it was necessary first to settle these problems and that he wished to learn the Japanese Government's stand in respect to them. In all this the President's attitude was the same as that of the State Department.

On the following day, the 8th, when Ambassador Nomura met with Hull, the latter's attitude had become all the more firm. Hull stated that the Four Principles were the most important considerations, and that the Japanese Government must show more clearly its intention to support them. In short, the

United States strongly maintained the attitude that the basis for any conversations between the Governmental Heads should be the same as the basis on which the earlier proposal for understanding was founded.

[37]

## XX

However, on September 3rd, at the same time that the interview was being held between Ambassador Nomura and President Roosevelt, a joint conference was being held in Tokyo to discuss a new proposal to be sent to the United States. This proposal was drawn up by the Foreign Office. Based upon a different principle from that of the Proposal for Understanding that was considered by Nomura and Hull in their previous informal conversation, it was in its essence a simplification of this proposal, and reads as follows:

1. Japan will not send occupational troops further than French Indo-China.
2. Japan will make an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact.
3. In accordance with a Japanese-Chinese Agreement, Japan will withdraw her troops from China.
4. Japan will not restrict American economic activities in China provided such activities are carried out along just lines.
5. The principle of nondiscrimination in respect to trade will be established in the Southwest Pacific.
6. The necessary steps will be taken to restore normal trade relations between Japan and America.

The above proposals were to be offered to the United States, and the United States was to reciprocate. The Foreign Office set great store by the proposal, and on September 4th Foreign Minister Toyoda conveyed this proposal to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo at the same time that Ambassador Nomura was conveying it to Secretary Hull.

This proposal was not exactly a new one, since Japan had done her utmost to make known her desires. However, it would be difficult to say how long it would take to consider all of the important fundamental principles contained in the Proposal for Understanding which was used as the basis for negotiations in April. Since, in having to consider all of these, the present crisis might not be averted, Japan's purpose was to bring up only the immediate and concrete problems and on these to base the conversations between the Governmental Heads.

However, the American interpretation was that Japan found it difficult to adopt, in toto, the Proposal for Understanding and therefore, to avoid the issue, was offering new proposals based upon a new policy. Under these [38] circumstances, contrary to the sanguine expectations of Foreign Office, the September 9th proposal merely invited misunderstanding and confusion.

Nor was it unreasonable that America should have fallen into this misunderstanding, since America had presented the June 21st Proposal to Japan as the final American proposal. As stated above, Japan's reply was dispatched on July 15th. However, because of the cabinet change, etc., Ambassador Nomura had failed to submit this reply to the American side. Thus, before the Japanese counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st had been received by Washington, another Japanese proposal dated September 4th had arrived. This seems to have been the principle reason for the American misunderstanding.

[39]

## XXI

While the complicated and prolonged diplomatic negotiations were being conducted between Tokyo and Washington, in Tokyo itself a question of special significance was being deliberated upon by the cabinet. The question was whether to continue negotiations indefinitely with America, or whether to break them off abruptly. And more important still, they were considering whether war with America would follow upon the heels of the breaking off of negotiations.

The diplomatic negotiations for establishing a better American-Japanese understanding were being participated in by only the highest leaders of the Government, Army, Navy and the Supreme Command. They were progressing to the absolute exclusion of lesser officials. With the sole exception of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, all the leading participants were hoping for the success of the negotiations, and for this very reason they were conducting it in absolute secrecy lest it encounter opposition.

Nevertheless, news began to leak out, particularly as a result of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's secret reports to the German and Italian Ambassadors.

As they began to perceive the general outline of the negotiations, the lesser officials began to give evidence of their disapproval. The Army in particular stiffened in its opposition. Just at this moment, the German-Soviet war suddenly broke out. Though the governmental leaders were able to set aside the insistent demands for an immediate war against the Soviets, they were obliged to decide upon the armed occupation of French Indo-China as a sort of consolation prize. At the same time, in order to be prepared for any emergency, they proceeded with full-scale preparations for a possible war against England and America. Though it was no easy task, the division between preparation for war and the war itself had to be firmly borne in mind. As preparations for war progressed, opposition to American-Japanese negotiations became more vociferous.

Meanwhile, the effect of Japan's armed occupation of French Indo-China was immediate and powerful. America immediately effected a breaking off of economic relations painful to Japan and without hesitation made clear that her own country's traditional policy alone was the policy conducive to peace. This strong American retaliation created a proportionate reaction in the anti-American camp in Japan. Opposition to American-Japanese negotiations came out into the open, and the course of action of the Cabinet, which had been created expressly for this purpose, became fraught with difficulties. Developments finally induced me to request a personal interview with the American President. However, the fact of the existence of the so-called "Konoye Message" had leaked out as a consequence of the conversations between Nomura and the President, and, while the actual contents were not known, various vague conjectures began to circulate, making even more difficult the problems confronting negotiations. It would [40] seem that from about August 1941, the Army General Staff, even including the highest quarters, began advocating an immediate breaking off of negotiations and an opening of American-Japanese hostilities. Seeking in every possible way to contravene these policies, from the latter half of August I repeatedly held consultations with the Army and Navy Ministers and called together countless joint conferences. To a certain degree, the "National Policy" calling for the breaking off of negotiations and the immediate opening of hostilities against England and America was brought under discussion.

Thus it came about that on September 6th, at a conference held in the Imperial presence, the "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy of the Imperial Government" was decided upon. (See Appendix 5.)

On the day before the conference held in the Imperial presence, I had an audience with the Emperor in order to informally discuss the "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy of the Imperial Government." The Emperor, in examining the program, pointed out that it placed war preparations first and diplomatic negotiations second. This, he said, would seem to give precedence to war over diplomatic activities. He expressed the desire to question the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs regarding this point at the meeting on the following day. In reply I explained that the order of business in the program did not indicate any differences in degree of importance. I also said that the Government intended to pursue diplomatic negotiations as long as possible and to commence preparations for war only when there seemed no prospect of successful negotiation. I also suggested that if he wishes to question the Chiefs of the Supreme Command on the subject, perhaps it would be more advisable to summon them privately rather than question them at the conference. The Emperor requested that they be summoned at once. They arrived promptly and in my presence were asked the same question and gave the same answer that I had given. In continuing, the Emperor asked the Army Chief of Staff General Sugiyama what was the Army's belief as to the probable length of hostilities in case of a Japanese-American war. The Chief of Staff replied that he believed operations in the South Pacific could be disposed of in about three months. Turning to the Chief of Staff, the Emperor recalled that the General had been Minister of War at the time of the outbreak of the China Incident, and that he had then informed the Throne that the incident would be disposed of in about one month. He pointed out that despite the General's assurance, the incident was not yet concluded after four long years of fighting. In trepidation the Chief of Staff went to great lengths to explain that the extensive hinterland of China prevented the consummation of operations according to the scheduled plan. At this the Emperor raised his voice and said that if the Chinese hinterland was extensive, the Pacific was boundless. He asked how the General could be certain of his [41] three month calculation. The Chief of Staff hung his head, unable to answer. At this point the Navy

Chief of General Staff lent a helping hand to Sugiyama by saying that to his mind Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness. He said the patient's case was so critical that the question of whether or not to operate had to be determined without delay. Should he be let alone without an operation, there was danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while it might be extremely dangerous, would still offer some hope of saving his life. The stage was now reached, he said, where a quick decision had to be made one way or the other. He felt that the Army General Staff was in favor of putting hope in diplomatic negotiations to the finish, but that in case of failure a decisive operation would have to be performed. To this extent, then, he was in favor of the negotiation proposals. The Emperor, pursuing the point, asked the Chiefs of the Supreme Command if it was not true that both of them were for giving precedence to diplomacy, and both answered in the affirmative.

The Conference was held on September 6th at 10 AM in the Imperial presence. During the conference the President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara spoke up and said the proposal before the conference gave the impression that the emphasis was being placed upon war rather than upon diplomacy. He wished a clarification of the views of the Government and the Supreme Command on this point. The Navy Minister, representing the Government, answered Hara's question, but the Chiefs of the Supreme Command remained silent.

The Emperor now spoke up suddenly and seconded the opinion put forth by the President of the Privy Council, Hara, and expressed his regret that the Supreme Command had not seen fit to answer. He then took from his pocket a piece of paper on which was written a poem by the Emperor Meiji: "Since all are brothers in this world, why is there such constant turmoil?" After reading this poem aloud, the Emperor stressed that he had read it over and over again and that he was striving to introduce into the present the Emperor Meiji's ideal of international peace. Everyone present was struck with awe, and there was silence throughout the hall. Soon the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano, rose and said that he was filled with trepidation at the prospect of the Emperor's displeasure with the Supreme Command. The truth was, he said, that when the Navy Minister spoke, he had been under the impression that the Navy Minister was representing both the Government and the Supreme Command, and he had therefore remained silent. He assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of the Supreme Command most certainly concurred with the Navy Minister's answer; that they too were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way out. The meeting adjourned in an atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness.

[42]

## XXII

The American-Japanese negotiations gave the outward appearance of progress, and yet made no material headway. And while the proposal for an interview between the nation's leaders seemed perceptibly to move the President, no progress was made toward a realization of this objective. This was partly due to the fact that Ambassador Nomura's actions were governed solely by official cables from Tokyo, and for this reason Japan's true intentions were not fully transmitted. Therefore, I made up my mind to meet personally with Ambassador Grew. On September 6th, the day that the above mentioned "National Policy Outline" was approved, with the full cognizance of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers, I dined in extreme secrecy with Ambassador Grew and the Councilor to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman, who acted as interpreter. I stressed the fact that the present cabinet, including the Army and Navy representatives, was unified in its wish for a successful conclusion of negotiations, and moreover that the present cabinet was the only one capable of carrying it through. I also made a most significant statement when I said that should we miss this one opportunity, another one might not arise in our lifetime. I also informed them that the Japanese delegates to the proposed conference were all selected, including those of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Office. I laid emphasis upon the necessity of my meeting with the President at the earliest possible date in order that ideas could be exchanged concerning basic problems.

Ambassador Grew asked for my views regarding Hull's Four Principles, and I said that they were splendid as principles but when it came down to actual application a variety of problems arose. It was in order to solve these very problems that I deemed it necessary to hold the meeting with the President.

After this informal talk which lasted about one hour and a half, Ambassador Grew, who appeared to be much impressed, promised to report immediately the contents of the conversation in the form of a direct message from me to the President. He stated in all sincerity that the report he was about to despatch to the President was the most important cable to go from his hand since the start of his diplomatic career.

[43]

## XXIII

As far as Japan was concerned, since April, just about everything possible had been done to forward American-Japanese negotiations. I had taken the important step of proposing a personal interview with the President. I had sent him a message, and I had in addition explained by true feelings to Ambassador Grew. On the other hand, as a result of the important National Policy decided upon at the Imperial Conference on September 6th, as far as Japan was concerned, a point had been established beyond which negotiations could not proceed. We came more and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down. By this time we were largely aware of the difficulties confronting the negotiations, as well as the intentions of the United States. In other words, when it came to fundamentals, the difficulty was the "Four Principles," and when it came to more concrete obstacles, we were faced with the problems of the stationing of troops in China, the establishment of a principle of equal economic opportunity, and the problem of the Tripartite Pact. America seemed for the present to feel that Japan had no objections to the "Four Principles." And since I myself had told Ambassador Grew that they were "splendid as principles," it could well be imagined that this did not represent a real obstacle. Nevertheless, among certain elements of both the Army and the Foreign Ministries, there was undeniably powerful opposition even to agreeing upon these as principles. (The fact that the United States misinterpreted the Japanese proposal of August 28th was due to a misunderstanding on the part of Ambassador Nomura. There was considerable discussion as to whether this proposal should be cancelled, or whether Ambassador Nomura should be recalled.) However, since it was evident that to reject the "Four Principles" would be to doom the American-Japanese negotiations to failure, I was hard put to know how best to handle this problem.

In regard to the problem of a basic economic principle, Japan was prepared to acknowledge equal opportunity in China, and was of the optimistic opinion that America would understand her peculiar geographical relationship with that country. As for the problem of the Tripartite Pact—although the following cannot be considered as a record—the view had been put forward that it might be desirable for America to enter the European War since she would then waste her national strength. Nevertheless, I was of the opinion that a way could be found to settle these things if an interview could be arranged between myself and the President. Lastly, in respect to the stationing of troops, there were times when the Army seemed to hold the moderate view that pretext and form were of no importance, but at the very next moment one would come up against a firm resolution not to give in on any account. Even within Japanese Government circles there was a strong tendency to feel that this constituted a real problem.

[44] Moreover Government circles were of one opinion in feeling that an official indication of peace terms would have to be made if we were to ask the United States to act as liaison between ourselves and China. It was in the light of recent negotiations and after careful consideration that these terms were to be decided upon.

Thus at the Joint Conference of September 20th a proposal which adjusted and combined the views of the Japanese side was approved. (See Appendix VI.)

[45]

## XXIV

Thus, on Japan's side, there was the feeling that she had finally settled upon everything that should be expressed on paper, and she assumed the position that she would, beyond this depend entirely on diplomatic success.

Foreign Minister Tōjō decided that he would first of all unofficially submit the conditions of Sino-Japanese peace to the American side. Thus on September 22nd he himself presented these conditions to Ambassador Grew, and on the 23rd, presented them to Secretary of State Hull through Ambassador Nomura. At this time Ambassador Nomura brought up the problem of a meeting with leaders who in principle were supposed already to have received the approval of

the President himself and requested Secretary Hull to grant him "agreement at least in principle," but this was a procedure which surely would be questioned. Since Secretary Hull had frequently gone so far as to disclose to other people the opinion of the State Department that the President had "gone too far," this proposal by Ambassador Nomura might have been something he was waiting for, but in any case he was completely hesitant about giving a definite answer. The feeling existed that the effect of thus unofficially submitting the peace terms was to bring about a sharp turn-about in the attitude of the United States to the problem of our stationing armed forces in China. The Americans said, and they stated that Foreign Minister Toyoda so explained it, "Whereas we had understood that Japan would at once withdraw all of its forces from China, sign a new treaty, and through its terms station its armed forces in fixed areas, according to the terms that were unofficially submitted, it would have a portion of the expeditionary forces then abroad remain just as they were, and would withdraw the rest; if this is so, the stories differ." Though the actuality was the same, the attitude taken was that the forms differ in their real nature.

On the 23rd, Foreign Minister Toyoda and Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau, explain in detail to Councillor Dooman the reasons for the stationing of troops, and as to the substance itself of the stationing of troops (in China) the American side also had no objection. The problem resided in the forms to be followed. On this point the American side in the end did not yield.

On September 27th, Foreign Minister Toyoda submitted to the opposite side the comprehensive Proposal for Understanding that was determined upon on September 20th and that had been reserved to the last. Thus, on that day, on the one hand, the Foreign Minister himself handed it over to and explained it to Ambassador Grew, and, on the other hand, at Washington, Ambassador Nomura and Matsudaira visit Valentine and present this plan.

[46] At the Foreign Office, they regarded this plan only about as follows: "It is our opinion, that as far as American desires are concerned, it is all right to use this plan as a basis and to proceed with negotiations." But they did not embark upon any principle that they would proceed with this plan alone, in complete disregard of the various plans of the past. This was a matter of diplomatic technique, but it was hard to believe that it was proper.

[47]

XXV

As expected, on October 2nd the United States submitted a memorandum (See Appendix 7). The point of this memorandum which drew attention was that the United States, just as before, regarded with utmost importance the plan of September 4th. This observation was based, for one thing, on the fact that the memorandum took the form of an answer to the plan of September 4th, but nevertheless, since the Japanese side had on September 27th put forth a comprehensive final plan, the Americans, depending on the manner of handling, might have concentrated their attention upon this latter plan. In actuality, as stated before, half of the responsibility for this state of affairs might have been due to the attitude of our Foreign Office authorities in laying stress upon the plan of September 4th. Perhaps the Americans interpreted the complete plan as being simply an explanation of the plan of September 4th. But they did not mention this specifically. They stated that "It is regrettable that the negotiations that had almost reached a settlement have been split by the September 4th plan." They were concerned to the very end with the September 4th plan. And, as before, the Americans limited too much the applications of the peace policy made manifest by Japan, and the application of the principle aimed against economic discrimination. They also criticized the stationing of troops in China as a condition of peace between Japan and China. As for the Tripartite Pact, they expressed no opinion whatsoever. From its tone, one can understand that they still raised their greatest objections to the matter of stationing troops in China. Thus, in short, they said, "Japan agrees with the Four Principles, and gives wide guarantees for peace, but on concrete matters it contradicts them or insists upon delimiting them unreasonably." It seemed that because of this memorandum pessimistic arguments about the future of Japanese-American negotiations took on a darker color all at once.

On October 7 the Foreign Minister invited Ambassador Grew to visit him and devoted himself to sounding out the real intentions of the United States. However, the Ambassador, contrary to previous occasions, was extremely circumspect. He made almost no explanations, and gave no pledges whatsoever. In Washington,

too, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull in accordance with instructions and strove to arrive at a break in the deadlock, but he was similarly unsuccessful. Later, Hamilton, in accordance with instructions from Hull, called upon the Ambassador, and said, "America's intentions are completely set forth in the memorandum of October 2nd, and in the plan of June 21st as more or less revised." He did no more than indicate that when the Japanese side had scrutinized these carefully and would again revise its plan of September 4th, then the United States was prepared to give it (the revised version) careful consideration.

[48] About this time, even though the Japanese alone were stating their opinions on all sorts of problems, the Americans merely criticized or attacked these and did not at all try to show what was in their minds. This was the point on which the Japanese felt dissatisfaction. The focal point of their diplomacy was directed toward making the United States say something on its own side. At the same time, day by day, in the midst of anxiety, suspicion and fretfulness, the argument gained strength that "Since the United States had already discovered the innermost mind of Japan, it will henceforth only drag out negotiations as long as possible. In contrast to Japan, it feels no need to bring negotiations to a swift conclusion. Rather, if the negotiations were to extend themselves, the longer they did so the better it would be for the United States. Therefore it should be concluded that there is no sincerity on the part of the United States."

On October 13th, Minister Wakasugi, who had returned from Tokyo to his post of duty, called upon Under-Secretary Welles on receipt of telegraphic instructions, and spoke intimately with him on the entire range of Japanese-American negotiations. He tried somehow or other to draw out positive expressions of opinion from the American side, but although Welles did say that "There is no change at all on the point that the President and Hull desire a meeting with Premier Konoye, just as soon as the three problems that are outstanding are settled," as regards the question, "If that is so, what is the opinion of America on those problems?" there was only an insistence on the point, that, "This also is fully taken up in the memorandum of October 2nd, and a clarification beyond this is unnecessary."

In the end, the Japanese side insisted that "It is now the United States' turn to say something," and to this the Americans continued to say stubbornly. "It is Japan's turn." The negotiations had now reached a complete deadlock.

In the end, it was just as Ambassador Nomura's report had it, "The opposite side will not retreat at any point its former position. It will firmly adhere to its answer of October 2nd, and it takes the stand that it will consider at any time any Japanese proposal that agrees with it." On the Japanese side, we did indeed make up an answer to this memorandum of October 2nd, but nothing was achieved by it that improved the situation, and in any case the urgency of the political situation in Japan increased with oppressive force, and at last resulted in the resignation of the Cabinet en masse.

[49]

## XXVI

After Japan's final comprehensive plan had been determined upon at the joint conference of September 20th, the activities of the Government frequently began to show an acute seriousness. This was by reason of the balance struck between the progress of Japanese-American negotiations on the one hand and on the outline of national policy determined upon in the conference that was held on September 6th in the presence of the Emperor. On September 24th, and 25th, I held conferences for two days with the War Minister, the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. From the 27th to October 1st, I took a rest at Kamakura, but during that time I called the Navy Minister, Oikawa, and asked in detail concerning the atmosphere in his circle. Upon the arrival of the American memorandum of October 2nd, I went to the Imperial Palace on the 4th. Afterwards, driving away a group of bureau chiefs, I held a liaison conference with only the Cabinet Ministers and the leaders of the Supreme Command. On the evening of the 5th, I asked the War Minister to come to my house in Ogikubo, and expressed my opinion that I would continue negotiations to the very end.

Late on the night of the 7th, the War Minister visited me in my Japanese-style rooms, and declared, "As to the problem of withdrawing troops from China, such a formality as to once withdraw—in principle—all troops and after that to station them there, as insisted upon by the United States, is something that is difficult for the Army to submit to". In view of the stiff attitude of the Army, on both the 6th and 8th, I conferred separately with the Minister of the Navy



and with the Foreign Minister, and deliberated with them on the methods of avoiding a crisis. The Foreign Minister further visited me twice on the 10th, and we spoke intimately on how we might somehow or other continue the negotiations. The joint conference also held a meeting on October 11th. During this time the movements of the three *chōkan* (the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Director of the Bureau of Legislation, and the Chief Secretary of the Board) and especially of President Suzuki (of the Cabinet Planning Board) became objects of attention.

October 12th. My fiftieth birthday. In spite of its being Sunday, early in the afternoon I gathered together the three ministers, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Foreign Minister, together with President Suzuki of the Cabinet Planning Board at Ogibuko, and held with them almost the last conference relative to peace or war. Before this meeting there was previous notification from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet as follows: "The Navy does not desire a rupture in the negotiations. Thus it wishes as much as possible to avoid war. But as far as the Navy is concerned it can not of itself bring this openly to the surface and say so. At today's conference the Navy Minister is expected to say that the decision for peace or war is entirely up to the Premier, so I beg you to keep this matter in your mind."

[50] Surely enough, at the very beginning there were the following opening remarks by the Minister of the Navy: "We have now indeed come to the cross-roads where we must determine either upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely up to the Premier, and, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, we ought to proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to fruition. If in the midst of negotiations—after negotiations have gone on for two or three months, one says that "they won't do from any point of view, and "well, we've got to have war now,—the Navy will be put to inconvenience. If we are to have war, we must determine upon war here and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to have us proceed upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no matter what happens." To this I said, "If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I myself would decide on continuing the negotiations." But the Minister of War said, "This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought we not to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of bringing the negotiations to fruition? To carry on negotiations for which there is no possibility of fruition, and in the end to let slip the time for fighting, would be a matter of the greatest consequence. In fact, does the Foreign Minister think that there is any possibility or not of bringing the negotiations to fruition?" Thus, turning to the Foreign Minister, he asked this question, whereupon the Foreign Minister replied, "That depends entirely on the conditions. The most difficult point in the problem today, I believe, is the matter of stationing troops in China, but if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from its former assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if on this point the Army states that it would be all right to make concessions, however small they may be, then we can not say that there is no hope of bringing the negotiations to fruition." But the Minister of War said in answer to this, "The problem of the Stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army, and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all." I said, "At this time isn't it all right to forget about the glory but to take the fruits; perform the formalities as America wants, and achieve a result that will in actuality be the same as 'stationing troops.'" To this, the Minister of War did not yield, and in the end, though the conference lasted from two o'clock till six o'clock, we did not arrive at any conclusion and adjourned.

On the next day, the 13th, I went to the Palace and made a detailed report on the crisis which the Cabinet was facing. Then I spoke intimately with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido. On the following day, the 14th, at nine o'clock in the morning, prior to the meeting of the Cabinet, I asked the Minister of War to come to my official residence and once again asked his considered opinion concerning the problem of the stationing of troops. I said, "I have a very great responsibility for the [51] China Incident, and today, when this Incident has lasted four years and still sees no settlement, I find it difficult to agree, no matter what is said, to enter upon a great war the future of which I can not at all foresee. On this occasion, we ought to give in for a time, grant to them the United States the formality of withdrawing troops, and

save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war. Moreover, I believe that on this occasion both from the point of view of the nation's strength and from the point of view of the people's thinking it is necessary to end the China Incident. The advancement and development of the nation are, of course, things that we should aspire to, but in order to develop greatly we need also at times to fall back and to cultivate the national strength." Thus did I declare my sincerest feelings and explain them to the Minister of War. To this, the Minister of War declared, "If at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop. The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the honor and of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to agree from the point of view of maintaining the fighting spirit of the Army." Thus he insisted and did not move from his position. Therefore, my talk with the Minister of War ended at odds, and as soon as possible as the meeting of the Cabinet opened, the Minister of War strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese-American negotiations should no longer be continued.

These opening remarks of the Minister of War were so sudden that the other Cabinet Ministers were somewhat taken aback and there was no one who would open his mouth to answer. The Cabinet meeting, after settling other subjects for discussion, made no reference to this problem of continuing negotiations and adjourned.

On the afternoon of the same day, Muto, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, came to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and said, "Somehow or other it seems that the reason that the Premier can not make up his mind is due to the fact that the Navy can not make up its mind. Thus, if the Navy really does not wish war the Army also must think about it. But the Navy does not say anything openly to the Army and only says that 'it will leave it up entirely to the Premier'. Just to say that it will be up to the decision of the Premier will not be enough to control the inner circles of the Army. But if the Navy will openly come to the Army and say that 'The Navy at this time does not wish war', then the Army can easily control its command. I wonder if you can not manage it so that the Navy will come and say something along this line." Thereupon, the Chief Secretary spoke to Oka, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, concerning this matter, but all that the latter could say was this: "As far as the Navy is concerned, no matter what anyone may think, for it to say that it does not wish war is something that it can not do in any formal manner. What the Navy can say is that 'it is entirely up to the decision of the Premier.'"

[52] Again that same night, Suzuki, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, came to my home in Ogikubo as the messenger of the War Minister. The War Minister's message was as follows: "According to what we have been able to discover lately, it looks as if the Navy does not wish to have war. If this is so, why does not the Navy Minister clearly say so to me? If there were any clear statements to me from the Navy Minister, then I too would have to reconsider matters once more. But it looks as if the Navy Minister is making the Premier shoulder the entire responsibility. This is indeed a matter of regret. If the Navy can not make up its mind, the conference on September 6th in the presence of the Emperor will have been fundamentally overturned. Hence, this would mean that, beginning with the Premier, the Ministers of War and the Navy and the President of the Supreme Command all did not sufficiently perform their responsibilities as advisors to the throne. Hence I believe that there is no other way but that at this time we all resign, declare insolvent everything that has happened up to now, and reconsider our plans once more. There is no one who is now a subject who has the power to keep control over the Army and the Navy and to refashion a plan. Therefore, I believe that at this time there is no other way but to have an Imperial Prince come forth as the leader of the next Cabinet. I believe, to begin with, that among the Imperial Princes, Prince Higashikuni is most suitable for the position. As far as myself am concerned, it is very hard for me to ask the Premier to resign, but as matters now have come to pass, I can not help but do so. I should like to beg that you kindly exert your efforts to having the Emperor ask Prince Higashikuni to become the next Premier."

The next day, the 15th, I went to the Palace and reported on developments since the last time that I had been there. At that time, I said, "Last night there was, indeed, a message from Tōjō, and he says that he would like to have Prince Higashikuni as the head of the succeeding Cabinet." Thus I inquired concerning the inner feelings of the Emperor, whereupon the Emperor said, "Prince Higashikuni, I believe, is indeed most suited to his position as Chief

of the General Staff. And I believe that to have a member of the Imperial Family stand in a Governmental position is something that requires considerable thought. In time of peace, it would be all right, but in a situation in which we fear that there may be war, and when we also think further of the interests of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing forth", but it did not seem that he was completely out of favor with the idea. On the way home, I met Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and broached the matter of Prince Higashikuni, but the Lord Keeper seemed not at all to rise to the idea.

The same night, I secretly visited the residence of Prince Higashikuni, reported to him the opinions of Tojo, the War Minister, and urged him to come forth. But the Prince said, "The matter is too important, so please let me think about it for two or three days." On the morning of the next day, the 16th, I spoke over the telephone with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal but [53] he said, "As to the matter of the Prince, there are great difficulties at the Imperial Court." But the situation was such that it did not allow for even a single day's delay. Thus from about ten o'clock in the morning, I had each Cabinet member come individually to the Japanese-style room of my official residence, stated the unavoidable reasons for a resignation, obtained their understanding, and in the evening, after gathering together all of their letters of resignation, went to the Palace. The letter of resignation of the Premier at that time was as follows (see Appendix 8).

After presenting the resignations, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, whereupon he said, "The Emperor will not appoint Prince Higashikuni as the next leader of the Cabinet. The leader of the next Cabinet will in any case become the subject of consultation at the meeting of the senior statesmen tomorrow, but as far as I myself am concerned, looking back on the chain of events up till today, I feel that it seems reasonable that the command to form the next Cabinet will fall on either the Navy or War Minister. As to which is better, the Navy or War Minister, we are now greatly racking our brains over it. What is your opinion?" Thus, I was asked by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, so I said, "From the point of view of politics, I feel that it is a post that is more suitable to the War Minister than to the Navy Minister. At the same time, the situation as it now stands is such that the War Minister is on the surface opposed to the continuation of negotiations between Japan and America; but, just as we may understand from his talk of two or three days ago, he even states that as long as the opinion of the Navy is not clear, we ought to declare everything insolvent and revise our plans, so I think that even if the Minister of War were to receive the command to form the next Cabinet, he would not plunge us immediately into war. Especially if there were a few words to this effect at the time of the command, I feel that the War Minister will take a prudent attitude all the more." It seemed that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also was of the same opinion. The Lord Keeper, furthermore, asked if I would be present at the conference of the senior statesmen on the following day and explain the chain of events leading to our resignation. I decided that I myself would not be present but would explain everything by means of a letter. The letter that I submitted to that conference of senior statesmen was as follows (see Appendix 9).

[54]

## SUPPLEMENT

[55]

## SUPPLYING OF MILITARY STORES AND MATERIALS

## PRO AND CON OF THE THEORY OF GRADUAL EXHAUSTION

The motive behind the Government's persistent efforts to bring Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion, which called for patience and more patience in view of world criticism, was the two great reasons described in a separate volume. Aside from these, an important consideration was the problem of economics, particularly the supplying of military stores and materials.

Reliance on Britain and America for material, particularly for military stores, was our big weakness. The Planning Board was ordered on several occasions from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet to consider ways and means of overcoming this weakness, but each time their reply was that it was an "impossibility."

The chief aim of the normalization of Japanese-American trade relations, which was one of the items of the Japanese-American negotiations as well as of the economic activities in the Southwest Pacific, was to obtain the materials mentioned above. During the negotiations, however, the order to freeze assets

became effective, making it impossible to obtain or to be supplied with these goods, and causing this problem to be an even more critical one. If matters were permitted to rest as they were, our stock piles would gradually dwindle. The principal advocates of war, therefore, proposed starting the war against America without delay.

There were no means of avoiding this gradual impoverishment of military supplies other than to obtain goods through the successful conclusion of Japanese-American negotiations, or by increasing domestic production, at least to the extent of satisfying the requirements of the military. This was one of the main reasons for the extreme interest of the Government in the Japanese-American negotiations.

When the Japanese-American negotiations reached the danger point, the President of the Planning Board was again ordered to make a survey. This time, he reported that petroleum was the only item which posed a problem and that we could get along somehow as far as all other materials were concerned. Even where petroleum was concerned, it was reported that if two billion yen were sunk into expanding the synthetic oil industry, 530,000 tons could be produced by the end of 1943 and four million tons could be produced by the end of 1944. On the other hand, if the Netherland East [56] Indies were obtained through the force of arms, it is certain that the enemy would destroy all the oil field installations. Moreover, there would be the transportation problem. When there were given consideration, not more than 300,000 tons during the first year, and not over a million and a half tons during the second year, could be expected. It was believed that five or six years would be required before a five million ton figure could be reached.

In other words, even by force of arms, we would be unable to obtain oil in necessary quantities in the immediate future. The report clearly established the fact that the gradual impoverishment of military supplies could best be avoided by expanding the synthetic oil industry.

According to the decision reached by the Council in the Imperial presence on September 6th, "we shall resolve to open hostilities against America (Britain, and the Netherlands) if, by early October, there is no probability of our demands in the Japanese-American negotiations being met". There would therefore, be no objection to assuming that a resolution to open hostilities need not be made because a successful conclusion of the negotiations "is probable". Moreover, though the decision states that we shall resolve to open hostilities, it does not state that "hostilities will be opened". It would, therefore, be possible to proceed without war and with only the economic relations broken off, even if the Japanese-American negotiations end in failure. As a matter of fact, the Government did consider taking this step in the event that it could not be avoided, and then to consider secondary steps without haste.

The principal advocates of war, however, basing their arguments on the theory of the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and resources would not make any concessions. I, therefore, told the President of the Planning Board, Suzuki, that if this gradual impoverishment of oil and other military supplies and goods could be avoided by increasing domestic productions, then the domestic production facilities should be expanded regardless of how many billions in capital would be required. It seems extremely foolish to make such a great sacrifice as a war against America and Britain for the sake of such goods. President Suzuki concurred but added that opening hostilities was a matter of domestic politics. Shortly after this, the Cabinet resigned en masse and all came to an end.

Although this was a later occurrence, at the Senior Statesmen's Conference held on November 29th, which was just before the Tojo Cabinet plunged into the Greater East Asia [57] War, I asked whether it would not be possible to prevent the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and goods by stepping up domestic production; and that if it could be, was it not true that opening of hostilities against America, Britain, and the Netherlands, was not absolutely essential? Why could we not proceed as we were, with broken economic relations but without war, and at the same time consider subsequent plans, I asked. Prime Minister Tojo replied that from the time his Cabinet had been formed until today he had been concentrating on that point and could only conclude that, if we were to proceed with broken economic relations, even without war, the final consequences would be gradual impoverishment. That was the reason for reaching the decision to open hostilities, he said.

Prime Minister Tojo claimed that gradual impoverishment could not be avoided. President Suzuki claimed that gradual impoverishment could be avoided. One

of the two had to be lying. It must be admitted that President Suzuki's statement that "opening hostilities is a matter of domestic policies", was indeed one with much meaning.

[58]

## WAR WITH NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS

## THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND PRINCE ITO

On the occasion of an informal conversation with War Minister Tojo on the subject of the Japanese-American negotiations, the War Minister said: "Sometimes it is necessary for a man to risk his life in one leap." I replied: "This might happen once or twice in the course of an individual's life; however, a person in a responsible position, when he considers a 2600 year-old national polity and a hundred million subjects, cannot take such a risk."

Although I did not speak of this to the War Minister, there are people who talk about "crossing the Rubicon," or "risking the fate of the nation". Foreign Minister Matsuoka frequently uttered such phrases, and every time I heard them I had an uncomfortable feeling. "Crossing the Rubicon" and "risking the fate of the nation" are exciting words, but starting a war without seeing the prospect of success is very different from the case of an individual. At least, when one thinks of the 2600-year-old faultless national polity, one cannot act so irresponsibly. Even when criticized as slow or old-fashioned, people like myself cannot act in such a way.

However roundabout the way may seem, I firmly believe that war, unless it is a question of safety or 100% safety, must be avoided.

At this time there are a number of military men who speak in this manner: "We did not have 100% confidence in our success when we entered the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. It is, in fact, impossible to have such a thing as 100% confidence in victory".

At the time when War Minister Tojo and I dined together at my residence in Og kubo in the early part of October, we talked over Japanese-American problems, and I referred to the above opinion as follows:

"We believe that Ito and Yamagata had sufficient confidence in victory when they plunged into the Russo-Japanese war. If they plunged into the war without confidence in victory, they were being extremely irresponsible. Thus, even though the war ended in our favor, we should have to consider it as a pure bit of luck.

"Previous to the declaration of the Russo-Japanese war, Emperor Meiji experienced difficulty in making up his mind. Katsura, who was Premier at that time, decided one day that he would ask for the final words of the Emperor on that very [59] day. Prince Ito, however, held him back in order to allow the Emperor one more night in which to consider the problem.

"The following morning, Emperor Meiji granted an audience to Prince Ito and questioned him as to whether he had confidence in success. To this Prince Ito replied: 'The Russian forces will certainly not be able to set foot inside Chosen, and it will be possible for us to hold the Russians for a year along the line of the Yalu River. At some time during the year in which such a condition obtains, we can expect the intervention of a third nation. When we speak of a third nation, since Britain is our ally, and France and Germany are on the Russian side, we can mean none other than the United States. Hence we can commence preparations at once and with confidence in our success.'

"On hearing this, the Emperor was very much relieved, and at Council in the Imperial presence on the very same day he announced his final decision.

"However, this time there will be no third nation, and there will be no country ready to intervene. Hence any prediction as to future prospects of success is quite impossible. If, in spite of this, our country is to be plunged into war, the decision will have to be made with extreme care and with consideration of the national polity."

On the morning of October 14th I had a final consultation with War Minister Tojo in a Japanese-style room at my official residence. At that time, the War Minister stated: "I believe that the view of the Premier is rather overly pessimistic. This is because you are too well aware of the weak points of your own country. Is it not possible that the United States too has her weaknesses?"

Our conversation at this time threatened to lead us into violent disagreement over the problem of the withdrawal of troops. However, the War Minister finally said, in a voice filled with emotion: "All this must be due to the difference in our characters."

[60] THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SUPREME COMMAND AND STATE AFFAIRS  
FROM EACH OTHER

## THE ANGUISH OF CABINETS FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION

The fact that the Supreme Command and State Affairs are independent of each other has been a matter of anguish for cabinets from generation to generation.

During the present Japanese-American negotiations, too, the government on the one hand was conducting these negotiations with all its powers, but the military was vigorously making preparations in case the negotiations should be broken off: Moreover, as to what those preparations were, we did not know at all, and it was not possible to have them go along step by step with diplomacy. Since the military vigorously went about moving ships, mobilizing troops, etc., and these things were discovered by the United States, the United States would question the sincerity of our diplomacy, so that we were frequently embarrassed because the relationship between diplomacy and military matters was not smooth.

In the pressing atmosphere since September last year, when we were either to have war with the United States or not, Prince Higashikuni, who was one of the supporters of prudence, used to say that in order to effect a break in this situation there was no other way but for the Emperor to stand firm. But it is said that the Emperor—and this is something that he also said to me—said a number of times to Prince Higashikuni too, that he was having a hard time of it because of the military. On such occasions the Prince said to the Emperor that it wouldn't do for him to say things that a critic might say, but if he were to feel that anything was improper he should say so.

The fact that the Emperor practically never expressed his opinions, so rarely that one would think he was on the reserved side, was due, I think, to Prince Saionji, Count Makino, and others, who, thinking of the operations of a constitution in the English style, said that the Emperor, as far as possible, ought not to take the initiative and interfere in matters aside from stating three items at the time of issuing a command to form a new Cabinet, namely, respect for the constitution, not being unreasonable in diplomacy, and not bringing about sudden and great changes in the financial world.

But the Japanese constitution is built on a framework of direct rule by the Emperor, and is fundamentally different from the English constitution. Especially in reference to the problem of the authority of the Supreme Command, the [61] government has no power at all of raising its voice, and the only person who may restrain both the government and the Supreme Command is the Emperor. And yet, the fact that the Emperor is on the passive side, acting in the English style, gives rise to numerous difficulties in wartime, although it may be all right in peace. In the Japanese-American negotiations, I bitterly felt the fact that it could not be settled simply by the urgings and suggestions given, in the English style, by the Emperor.

To give one or two examples of our experience with the relationship between the Supreme Command and State Affairs, what was submitted at the meeting of the Cabinet at the time of the start of the China Incident was as follows: the dispatching of a division or so for the purpose of protecting Japanese residents over there was first proposed by the Minister of War, Sugiyama, and this was decided upon; but as to where those troops would go and as to what was to be done with them afterwards, the government did not know these things at all. At the time of the outbreak of the China Incident too, the dispatching of troops solely under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents was proposed at the meeting of the Cabinet, but as to what would happen to them afterwards, and what the intentions were as to their use, the situation was such that we did not know these things at all. At the time of a special session of the Diet, Otani, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, received my understanding, and after discussing the matter with the other Cabinet members too, directed his words to Sugiyama, the War Minister at a Cabinet meeting in the Diet Building and asked for an explanation of the following: that, in spite of the war situation expanding more and more; the members of the Cabinet knew nothing at all of the future; if nothing was done to keep it within certain bounds, then he was afraid that Japan would not be able to come out of it. But before Sugiyama, the War Minister, changed color and turning to Yonai, the Navy Minister, said fiercely, "What's the matter? Can't you see?" The Navy Minister Yonai, looked startled, and at this point, being the sort of person he is, said, "Is that so?" and withdrew

from further talk. However, this was enough finally to get a hint of the general situation. That there were talks between the Army and Navy can be seen from this, but as a matter of course they said nothing about these matters to the members of the Cabinet nor to the Premier. Among the Cabinet members there were those who afterwards protested as follows, "To call a Cabinet meeting 'this sort of place', what does he mean by that?" but there was nothing that could be done about it, and nothing further was said or done.

After that Cabinet meeting, during an audience with the Emperor, I told him what the situation in the Cabinet meetings was, and expressed my belief that although there were [62] among the members of the Cabinet those who came from the various political parties, etc., the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister at least ought to be given a general idea of things; but the Emperor said that he would like to have time to think about this matter. At the next audience I was told that there was an agreement between the Army and the Navy that the operations would stop between the Paoting and the Yingting Rivers, but that this information should go only to the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

After this, although Paoting was taken, the war situation expanded more and more, and when I questioned the Emperor about this a second time he said something to the effect that they had thought that they would stop things at about that point, but it was the kind of situation which I would not understand.

After the Cabinet meeting at which we determined to send to Shanghai, I asked Sugiyama, the War Minister, whether he was going as far as Nanking or thereabouts, and he said that he would not possibly go to Nanking.

At the time of the departure of General Matsui, the Supreme Commander in the Shanghai area, from Tokyo Station, he persistently told Sugiyama, the War Minister, to bring things about so that the Army would go as far as Nanking, and since the general had also told me the same thing, I asked the War Minister about it on the way home. He replied that although General Matsui spoke as he did, the Army would not possibly go as far as Nanking.

However, it soon came to pass that the Army had gone as far as Hankow, not to mention Nanking. How to attack Nanking concerns the military operations of the Army, and is not something that concerns the government, but unless the government knows in general about how far the Army is going, it stands to reason that it can make no move in diplomacy. Both in the case of the attacks on Nanking and Hankow, and in the spreading of the great military operations in North China, the China Incident has in all respects proceeded in this manner. If, from the beginning, the Army had had a far-reaching plan and had kept it a secret because of the demands of strategy, it would still have been embarrassing to the government, but there would have been something understandable about it. However, just as it had appeared in the conversation between Matsui and Sugiyama there was, as a matter of fact no great and firm plan. The situation was such that they were pushed on by developments and went on, gradually extending themselves. Herein lies the dangerous nature of [63] the China Incident. From the point of view of the relationship between State Affairs and the Supreme Command, among those matters that are dangerous is the point that things do not completely reach to the lower ranks of the Supreme Command. At the Five Ministers' Meeting that was convened after the great renovation of the first Konoye Cabinet, we took up, from the point of view of preserving international peace with Britain and America, each of 300 hostile incidents occurring between Japanese and Americans and between Japanese and Englishmen during the one-year period after the outbreak of the China Incident. But when we informed the Army Headquarters on the spot concerning their disposition, they acknowledged it but did not bring anything into actuality. And although we told them again in September or thereabouts, it was the same. After that, when a year and a half had passed and I examined the matter during the time of the second Konoye Cabinet, I could not but be amazed to find that just as before, not even one of the so-called outstanding questions had been settled. If one were to speak of egregious cases, the one where the Army was to remove ropes hung at railroad stations to prohibit the entering of foreigners had not been settled.

Recently Premier Tojo spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, and sympathetically that, now that he had become Premier, he understood for the first time how difficult it was for the previous Premiers to do things, and that he himself would to the very end proceed with a duplication of posts; to this I understand the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, replied that that

was not the first time that someone had said this, that it had been exactly the same from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet, and that, late though it may be, to have the Army realize this point was fine.

Again, when General Abe came to see me to express his greetings on taking the office of president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, he said that at first he declined Premier Tojo's invitation to accept office, whereupon Premier Tojo said that if he would not take the office he himself (Tojo) would have to do so, but if this were done, he would have to resign from active service and thus would not be able to keep this added portfolio of War Minister. It was thus that General Abe finally accepted the position.

Whether it be the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, or General Abe, they know from long experience that unless the same man is both War Minister and Premier, there can be no adjustment between diplomacy and military affairs. So we may believe that both were of the same opinion as Premier Tojo, and sympathized with his words. Even if Premier Tojo were to quit, someone would have to become the Minister of War, and his adding the post of Premier is something that will probably continue for a time.

[64] AMERICA GIVES UP NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE OF CABINETS

Ambassador Nomura returned to Japan in August. Soon afterward he visited me at my villa in Karuizawa with Ambassador Kuruu. I heard about the American situation from both Ambassadors. Because the Konoye Cabinet had resigned, and the Tojo Cabinet taken its place, America had concluded that there was no hope whatever for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations.

When Ambassador Nomura met President Roosevelt at the beginning of November, the President said that he had heard from reliable sources that Japan had finally decided upon war. The Ambassador denied this, but the President did not believe him. Also, Secretary Hull went so far as to say to Ambassador Nomura that he expected nothing whatever from Ambassador Kuruu's coming. It seemed that America had already given up hope for the negotiations.

The resignation en masse of the Konoye Cabinet gave a considerable shock to America. Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval Operations, and a close friend of Ambassador Nomura—he was captain of the ship which brought back Ambassador Saito's remains to Japan—visited Ambassador Nomura. At that time he said that he supposed that the reason for that resignation of the Konoye Cabinet was due to the fact that Premier Konoye considered the success of the Japanese-American negotiations to be hopeless, inasmuch as the President had refused the meeting which the Premier had proposed. However, the President had not refused flatly; there were merely two or three points which he wished to clear up. If these points had been clarified, he would have been more than willing to see him. It had been decided to send a personal message to that effect from the President to His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, and it was understood that steps already had been taken. Two or three days later, the Admiral again visited the Ambassador and told him that the decision referred and told him that the decision referred to on his previous visit had been cancelled, since opinions had arisen within the American Government that such a procedure would constitute an interference with internal affairs.

[65] APPENDICES

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(American) (Omitted. English original available)
2. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(Japanese)
3. Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Developments
4. American Counter Proposal
5. Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government
6. Proposal for Arriving at an Understanding for the Adjustment of Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations
7. American Memorandum of October 2 (Omitted. English original available)
8. Resignation of Premier Konoye at the Time of the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet
9. Details of the Cabinet Resignation and the Progress of Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiations under the Direction of the Council of Senior Statesmen following the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet



[66]

## APPENDIX I

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding—(American) (Omitted English Original Available)

[67]

## APPENDIX II

## PROPOSAL FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING

(TN. Official English Translation available in the State Department. An informal Translation follows:)

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America accept joint responsibility in drafting a general agreement for the purpose of restoring the traditional friendly relations between the two countries. No attempt will be made to enter into a discussion of the reasons for the recent deterioration of diplomatic relations. The purpose of these negotiations is to prevent the recurrence of incidents which tend to destroy the friendly relations between the peoples of the two countries or, in case unfortunate incidents do occur, to check the reverberations of the same.

It is the purpose of the two countries to work together for the establishment of peace in the Pacific based on the principles of morality and, by securing a deep and friendly understanding on mutual problems, to bring to an end to the sad turmoil which threatens to wipe out civilization. If this is impossible, it is the sincere purpose of the two countries to at least prevent the present struggle from spreading.

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned ideals must be carried out resolutely and speedily, the two Nations propose to draw up a general agreement based on the principles of morality and embodying measures for the attainment of immediate ends.

The present understanding covers only pressing problems and all related detailed considerations will be left for a later conference to work out. The two governments believe that a clarification of the attitudes and an adjustment of the matters covered in the following list will greatly contribute to improving relations:

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan.
2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.
3. The relationship of the two countries to the China Incident.
4. Commerce between the two countries.
5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific.
6. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific.

[68] The following understandings have been reached on these above-mentioned matters.

1. *International and National Ideals Embraced by America and Japan:* The two countries agree to respect each other's positions as equal and independent neighboring Pacific powers and declare their intention to bring about a new era of trust and co-operation based on mutual respect and a determination to bring about a lasting peace.

The two countries declare that all nations and all races form a universal family whose members should enjoy equality of opportunity, that their mutual interests and spiritual and material welfare should be furthered by peaceful means, and that the preservation of these blessings shall be the responsibility of all. They further declare that it has ever been their purpose to prevent the oppression of backward peoples.

The two countries declare that they shall mutually assist each other in preserving their traditional ideals and the social orders and moral principles upon which the lives of their respective peoples are based. They are also determined to prevent the influx of foreign ideas that would break up the present order.

2. *The Attitudes of the Two Countries Toward the European War:* It is the purpose of the Japanese and American Governments to cooperate in bringing about a world peace, to prevent the spread of the European War and to restore peace to the warring countries.

The Japanese Government declares that the Axis Pact is a defensive agreement and aims to prevent the entrance of any more nations into the European conflict. The Japanese Government further declares its intention to furnish military aid in pursuance of its responsibility under the Tri-Partite Pact, in case the situation outlined in Article 3 develops.

The American Government declares that it has no intention of taking sides in the European conflict either now or in the future. It also declares its antipathy toward war and states that it will take no part in the European conflict either now or in the future unless the welfare and safety of the nation itself are at stake.

3. *The Relationship of the Two Countries to the China Incident:* The American President understands the three principles of the Konoye Statement and those embodied in Japan's Treaty with Nanking and the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration which are based on those principles. He also has confidence in the good-neighbor policy of the Japanese Government and will immediately take steps to urge Chiang-Kai Shek's Government to make peace with Japan.

[69] In the event that the Chiang Regime accepts the advice of the American President, the Japanese Government will immediately take up peace negotiations with the United Government of China or with the various elements that will go to make up that Government.

After this agreement has been drawn up and ratified, the Japanese and American Governments will take mutual steps to guarantee the flow of necessary raw materials. Furthermore, both Governments will take suitable steps to restore the normal trade relations that existed while the Japanese-American Commercial Pact was in force. Whenever it is desired to make a new commercial agreement, conversations will be opened and study will be given to drawing up such a treaty following the usual precedents.

5. *Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Southwest Pacific:* In view of the fact that Japan has declared that it is her policy to expand her interests in the Southwest Pacific by peaceful means, America will co-operate in making it possible for Japan to secure the raw materials which it needs from those areas such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel.

6. *Policies of the Two Countries regarding Political Stability in the Pacific:*

A. Japan and America will jointly guarantee the permanent neutrality of the Philippines with the understanding that Japanese nationals in the Islands will not suffer discriminatory treatment.

B. Friendly consideration will be given to the matter of Japanese immigration to the United States and Japanese nationals shall be accorded treatment similar to that accorded to the nationals of other nations.

*Addendum:* It is understood that this Agreement shall be embodied in secret memoranda. Mutual exchange of views shall precede any decision to announce the contents of this Agreement and the time of such announcement.

[70]

### APPENDIX III

#### AN OUTLINE OF THE POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS

(Decision reached at the Conference held in the Imperial Presence on July 2)

##### I. POLICY

1. The Imperial Government is determined to follow a policy which will result in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and world peace, no matter what international developments take place.

2. The Imperial Government will continue its effort to effect a settlement of the China Incident and seek to establish a solid basis for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve an advance into the Southern Regions and, depending on future developments, a settlement of the Soviet Question as well.

3. The Imperial Government will carry out the above program no matter what obstacles may be encountered.

##### II. SUMMARY

1. Steps will be taken to bring pressure on the Chiang Regime from the Southern approaches in order to bring about its surrender. Whenever demanded by future developments the rights of a belligerent will be resorted to against Chungking and hostile concessions taken over.

2. In order to guarantee national security and preservation, the Imperial Government will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the southern regions and also carry out various other plans as may be necessary. In case the diplomatic negotiations break down, preparations for a

war with England and America will also be carried forward. First of all, the plans which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories.

In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article, we will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America.

3. Our attitude with reference to the German-Soviet War will be based on the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact. However, we will not enter the conflict for some time but will steadily proceed with military preparations against the Soviet and decide our final attitude independently. At the same time, we will continue carefully correlated activities in the diplomatic field.

[71] In case the German-Soviet War should develop to our advantage, we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and guarantee the safety of our northern borders.

(Pencilled Note: On this occasion the Army and Foreign Minister Matsuoka took a strong attitude toward the Soviet Union, and the Army began concentrating its armed forces in Manchoukuo. This resolution was drawn up to off-set the policies of the Army and the Foreign Minister.)

4. In carrying out the preceding article all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America.

5. In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action.

6. We will immediately turn our attention to placing the nation on a war basis and will take special measures to strengthen the defenses of the nation.

7. Concrete plans covering this program will be drawn up separately.

[72]

#### APPENDIX IV

##### THE AMERICAN COUNTER PROPOSAL

(TN: The original document is available in the State Department. An informal translation of the Japanese copy follows.)

The United States of America and the Japanese Government share responsibility in drawing up a joint declaration and a general agreement aiming at the restoration of their traditional friendly relations.

No effort will be made to enter into a discussion of the special reasons for the recent deterioration of diplomatic relations, but it is the sincere desire of both countries to prevent the recurrence of anything which would cause a further deterioration in friendly relations or, in case unexpected and unfortunate events do occur, to check the reverberations of the same. It is the purpose of the United States and Japan to establish a lasting peace in the Pacific and, by effecting a friendly mutual understanding, to promote the interests of world peace. Furthermore, if it is impossible to bring to a speedy end the present war which could easily result in the destruction of civilization, the two countries will cooperate in preventing the spreading of that conflagration.

It is felt that prolonged discussions would be fruitless and that they are out of place at a time which demands speedy and resolute action. Therefore, the two countries are resolved to effect a general understanding based on the principles of morality and to take certain measures to guide their actions in the future.

The two governments are agreed that only important questions demanding emergency action should be included in the agreement, leaving related and minor matters to be settled by a future conference.

The two governments acknowledge that a clarification of the attitudes and problems listed below will bring about a friendly reconciliation.

1. American and Japanese ideals with reference to international relations and the nature of the state.

2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War.

3. Plans for the establishment of peace between Japan and China.

4. Commerce between the two countries.

5. The economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific area.

6. Policies of the two countries regarding the political stability of the Pacific area.

[73] 7. The neutrality of the Philippine Islands.

Therefore, the Governments of the United States and Japan issue the following statements concerning their policies and mutual understandings:

1. American and Japanese Ideals with Reference to International Relations and the Nature of the State:

The two countries affirm that it is their policy to work for the establishment of permanent peace and to bring about a new era characterized by mutual trust between their two peoples. They declare that it is their present and traditional belief that all nations and all peoples form one great family characterized by the ideals of harmony, justice and equity. They acknowledge that the relations of nations and peoples should be built up and improved by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based on a consideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal privileges should be based on a mutual sharing of responsibility. Each nation must take care not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the surest way of preserving its own welfare. Furthermore, the two Governments will work together to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other peoples.

The two Governments acknowledge their responsibility in safeguarding the traditional ideals, the social orders and the basic and moral principles underlying the national lives of each other's peoples and in preventing the infl x of any disturbing ideologies.

2. The Attitudes of the Two Countries towards the European War:

The Japanese Government declares that the purpose of the Tri-Partite Pact is and always has been a defensive one. The said Treaty aims to prevent the spreading of the European War by the unprovoked entrance of additional powers into the struggle.

The United States Government declares that its present and future policy toward the European War is to avoid participating in it unless its own safety is endangered.

Note: This article embodies a tentative proposal for a change in the corresponding article in the American proposal of May 31, 1941.

3. Plans for the Establishment of Peace between Japan and China:

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government has informed the American Government concerning the basic conditions of her proposal for a Sino-Japanese peace based on a good-neighbor policy and respect for [74] each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as embodied in the Konoye principles, the American President will propose to the Government of China that the latter enter into negotiations with Japan looking toward the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of a mutually advantageous peace.

Note: The problem of joint action against the inroads of communism and the matter of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, which are covered in the preceding paragraph, can be changed, if desired, in later negotiations. The matter of stationing Japanese troops on Chinese territory is a part of the communist problem). We believe that any proposals, for the revision of this paragraph and any additional proposals in regard to these matters should be embodied in one draft and that the entire resulting proposal should be given unified consideration to the satisfaction of all concerned.

4. Commerce between the Two Countries:

With the formal ratification of this understanding, America and Japan agree to furnish each other with needed raw materials. They also agree to restore the normal commercial relations which existed under the former Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. In case the two countries desire to draw up a new commercial treaty, negotiations will be entered upon immediately to draw up the same in harmony with the usual precedents.

5. The Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Pacific Area:

Japan and America's activities in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, and all countries shall be guaranteed equal commercial opportunities. Based on this agreement, the Japanese and American Governments will cooperate in assisting one another in securing the natural resources, such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel, which are necessary to guarantee the safety and development of their national economies.

6. Policies of the Two Countries Regarding the Political Stability of the Pacific Area :

Both governments agree that the fundamental principle underlying this understanding is a guarantee of peace in the Pacific area. They will exert all possible efforts to cooperate in the preservation of that peace and declare that they have no territorial ambitions in the said area.

7. The Neutrality of the Philippine Islands :

The Japanese Government declares that it is prepared to enter into negotiations to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines [75] whenever the American Government decides to grant independence to that nation.

THE ORAL STATEMENT

The Secretary of State appreciates the sincere efforts of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates in working for a mutual understanding and the establishment of peace in the Pacific. The Secretary also appreciates the straightforward attitude of these officials in recent conversations.

The American Government shares the earnest desire of the Japanese Ambassador that Japanese-American relations be speedily improved so that peace may be restored to the Pacific area. The Secretary of State himself shares the same spirit and has given careful consideration to the various viewpoints embodied in the Japanese proposal. The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many of Japan's leaders share the viewpoint of the Ambassador and his associates and support them in pressing forward to the attainment of our high purposes. Unfortunately, however, among the powerful leaders of Japan are some who have committed themselves to follow the path of Nazi Germany and its policy of aggression. These people can think of no other possible understanding with America than that they must join on Hitler's side in the event that America's considerations of self-defense force her into the European War. Well-authenticated reports to this effect have been flowing to this Government from many different countries and from the pens of many who for many years have been very friendly to Japan.

The tone of many recent unnecessary declarations by Japanese spokesman concerning Japan's plans and promises under the Tri-Partite Pact unmistakably reveal this attitude. As long as those occupying responsible positions keep up this attitude and persist in directing Japan's public opinion in this direction, any hopes for the acceptance of the proposals now under consideration or the attainment of practical results from these discussions are inevitably doomed to disillusionment.

Another source of suspicion in the Japanese proposals is the suggestion which calls for the stationing of troops in Inner Mongolia and North China for the ostensible purpose of cooperating with China in the suppression of communism.

Very careful consideration has been given this matter. While it is not desired to enter into a discussion of the actual nature of this problem, as has often been stated to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, the United States cannot agree to any plan which runs counter to the principles of freedom which have always been supported by the American Government. While it is admitted that careful consideration would naturally have to [76] have to be given before agreeing to any concessions which might adversely affect this nation, in this case the freedom of a third power is involved and this government will, therefore, have to give very special consideration to the problem. Therefore, the Secretary of State has unfortunately been driven to the conclusion that the United States Government must ask the Japanese Government for a statement clearer than any heretofore ever delivered which will show that the said Government is impelled by a desire to follow the ways of peace, as this forms the basic principle which should underlie the understanding we are attempting to arrive at. This government earnestly desires that the Japanese Government will make a clear statement clarifying its attitude on this point.

Note: This is an informal, tentative and unbinding statement delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on May 31 in an endeavor to bring these negotiations in line with the present situation. On June 21 a revised proposal was handed to the Japanese Ambassador.

## APPENDIX V

## [77] PLANS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

(Agenda for a Council in the Imperial Presence)

In view of the increasingly critical situation, especially the aggressive plans being carried out by America, England, Holland and other countries, the situation in Soviet Russia and the Empire's latent potentialities, the Japanese Government will proceed as follows in carrying out its plans for the southern territories as laid in "An Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Developments".

1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with America (and England and Holland) in order to secure our national existence, we will proceed with war preparations so that they be completed approximately toward the end of October.

2. At the same time, we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England. Japan's minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England), together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the attached document.

3. If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland).

Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid. Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from forming a united front against Japan.

## ANNEX DOCUMENT

## A LIST OF JAPAN'S MINIMUM DEMANDS AND HER MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN HER NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMERICA AND ENGLAND

I. *Japan's Minimum Demands in her Negotiations with America (and England).*

1. America and England shall not intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the China incident.

(a) They will not interfere with Japan's plan to settle the China Incident in harmony with the Sino-Japanese Basic Agreement and the Japan-China-Manchoukuo Tri Partite Declaration.

(b) America and England will close the Burma Route and offer the Chiang Regime neither military, political nor economic assistance.

[78] *Note:* The above do not run counter to Japan's previous declarations in the "N" plan for the settlement of the China Incident. In particular, the plan embodied in the new Sino-Japanese Agreement for the stationing of Japanese troops in the specified areas will be rigidly adhered to. However, the withdrawal of troops other than those mentioned above may be guaranteed in principle upon the settlement of the China Incident.

Commercial operations in China on the part of America and England may also be guaranteed, in so far as they are purely commercial.

2. America and England will take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to the defense of the Empire.

(a) America and England will not establish military bases in Thai, the Netherlands East Indies, China or Far Eastern Soviet Russia.

(b) Their Far Eastern military forces will not be increased over their present strength.

*Note:* Any demands for the liquidation of Japan's special relations with French Indo-China based on the Japanese-French Agreement will not be considered.

3. America and England will cooperate with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials.

(a) America and England will restore trade relations with Japan and furnish her with the raw materials she needs from the British and American territories in the Southwest Pacific.

(b) America and England will assist Japan to establish close economic relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies.

II. *Maximum Concessions by Japan.*

It is first understood that our minimum demands as listed under I above will be agreed to.

1. Japan will not use French Indo-China as a base for operations against any neighboring countries with the exception of China.

*Note:* In case any questions are asked concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, the answer is to be that as long as Soviet Russia faithfully carries out the Neutrality Pact and does not violate the spirit of the agreement by, for instance, threatening Japan or Manchuria, Japan will not take any military action.

2. Japan is prepared to withdraw her troops from French-Indo-China as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East.

3. Japan is prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands.

[79]

#### APPENDIX VI

##### A PROPOSAL FOR ARRIVING AT AN UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

(TN: Official translation available in State Department)

The American and Japanese Governments accept joint responsibility for initiating negotiations looking toward a general agreement embodying a joint statement on Japanese-American understanding aiming at the restoration of the traditional friendship between the two nations.

It is believed that it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the special reasons for the recent deterioration of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. It is the sincere desire of both countries to aim at the prevention of any further incidents tending to destroy friendly relations or, if any unexpected and unfortunate events do occur, to check the reverberations of the same.

The two countries agree to cooperate in bringing about peace in the Pacific, to make an effective contribution to the preservation of that peace, to bring about friendly relations in order to promote world-wide peace and to bring to an end the tragic struggle which now threatens to destroy civilization or at least to prevent the same from spreading over a wider area.

A decisive resolution of this kind precludes long and delaying negotiations which might only tend to vitiate the same. The two countries desire quickly to formulate an understanding and to determine the necessary measures for implementing the same.

Only important questions requiring emergency action will be covered in this agreement while minor related matters will be postponed to a future conference.

The two countries believe that a clarification of the attitudes and other matters listed below will greatly improve their mutual relations.

1. American and Japanese ideas on international relations and the nature of the state.

2. The attitude of the two countries towards the European War.

3. Plans for appeasement of the Sino-Japanese problem.

4. Commerce between the two countries.

[80] 5. Economic questions in the Southwest Pacific Area.

6. Policy for the political stability of the Pacific area. Therefore, the two countries have agreed to make the following declarations concerning their plans for mutual understandings.

1. American and Japanese Ideas on International Relations and the Nature of the State:

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to establish a lasting peace and to set up a new era characterized by cooperation and mutual trust.

The two countries further declare that it is and ever has been their firm conviction that all nations and all peoples should form one great family based on the ideals of justice, equity and harmonious living. They acknowledge that this comity of nations and peoples should be built up by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based on a consideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal privileges should be based on a sharing of responsibility. Each nation must take care not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the surest way of preserving its own welfare. Furthermore, the two governments acknowledge their responsibility to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other peoples.

The two governments acknowledge their responsibility for safeguarding the traditional ideals, the social order, and the basic and moral principles

underlying the national lives of each other's peoples in preventing the influx of any disturbing ideas or ideologies.

## 2. The Attitude of the Two Sountries Towards the European War :

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to bring about peace in the world and that they are determined to work together in bringing an end to the present conflict whenever a suitable occasion arises. Until the restoration of world peace, the two countries are determined to act only in self-defense. With reference to her interpretation of and her obligations in the European War under the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan reserves freedom of action in case America should join that conflict.

## 3. Plans for a Peaceful Settlement of the S'no-Japanese Problem :

The two governments recognize that brining a peaceful end to the China Incident will prove to be a large contribution to the interests of world peace and they are therefore determined to bring an early end to that conflict.

[81] America acknowledges Japan's efforts and her sincerity in endeavoring to settle the China Incident and in bringing about an early cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace. America will urge China to open up peace negotiations with Japan and will place no obstacles in the way of any efforts which Japan may make to settle the China Incident. The Japanese Government declares that its basic conditions for the settlement of the China Incident are those embodied in the Konoye Statement and in the Sino Japanese Agreement which is in harmony therewith. It further declares that Sino-Japanese economic cooperation shall be undertaken by peaceful means, that international trade shall be nondiscriminatory, that special rights inherent in geographical proximity will be respected, and that the economic activities of Third Powers will not be interfered with provided they are based on the priciples of fairness.

Note : The basic conditions upon which Sino-Japanese peace is to be based are as given in a separate document. These were decided upon at the joint conference.

## 4. Commerce between the Two Countries :

The two countries are agreed to take immediate steps for the restoration of normal trade relations between them. They guarantee that their mutual freezing orders will be cancelled and they they will assist each other in furnishing necessary raw materials.

5. Economic Questions in the Southwest Pacific Area : The two countries covenant to carry on their economic activities in the Southwest Pacific by peaceful means alone. They further guarantee that the principle of non-discrimination shall characterize their international trade. The two countries are agreed to cooperate in permitting all reasonable latitude in commercial intercourse and international investments in order to make it possible for each nation to secure those raw materials and those articles which are necessary for it to preserve and build up its economic life.

They are agreed to cooperate in a distribution of oil, rubbber, nickel, tin and other special raw materials and special products without discriminating against anyone and to make the necessary agreements with the countries concerned in order to carry out this principle.

## 6. Policy for the Political Stability of the Pacific Area :

The two countries realize the vital importance of bringing about the immediate stabilization of the situation in the Pacific area and covenant to take no steps which would tend to threaten that stability. The Japanese Government agrees not to use its troops stationed in French-Indo China for military operations against neighboring countries (China excluded) and, further, to withdraw its troops from French-Indo China as soon as peace is restored in the Pacific area.

[82] The United States Government agrees to cut down its military establishments in the Southwest Pacific. The two countries agee to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thai and the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, they declare their readiness to make an agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines when independence is granted that nation.



[83]

## ANNEXED DOCUMENT

## THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS ON WHICH SINO JAPANESE PEACE IS TO BE BASED

1. Good Neighbor Policy.
2. Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.
3. Sino-Japanese Defensive Cooperation.

This Sino-Japanese cooperation includes action against communism and any other movements which tend to disrupt the present order and mutual efforts to preserve the peace.

This envisages the stationing of Japanese troops and Japanese warships for a limited time in stated areas in harmony with past agreements and precedents.

4. Withdrawal of Troops.

All troops which have been sent to China in connection with the China Incident will be withdrawn except those mentioned in the preceding article.

5. Economic Agreement.

a. A Sino-Japanese economic agreement will be drawn up covering the exploitation and utilization of those raw materials necessary in the national defense program.

b. It is understood that the preceding understanding shall not limit the economic activities of Third Powers providing they are carried out in harmony with the principle of fairness.

6. A Unification of the Chiang Regime and the Wang Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No reparations.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

[84]

## APPENDIX VII

AMERICAN MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 2. (Omitted. English original available)

[85]

## APPENDIX VIII

## THE RESIGNATION OF PREMIER KONOYE AT THE TIME OF THE RESIGNATION OF THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET

By Your Majesty's Humble Servant, Fumimaro

At the time when I was honored for the third time with the totally unexpected Imperial order to organize a Cabinet, I felt that it was very urgent for the sake of guaranteeing the future progress of the nation to put forth all possible efforts to continue the negotiations with America and bring about a speedy settlement to the China Affair. We have, therefore, exerted ourselves to the utmost in conducting successive conversations with the American Government and have endeavored to bring about a meeting between the President of the United States and myself. The result of these efforts is still pending. Recently, however, War Minister Tojo has come to believe that there is absolutely no hope of reaching an agreement with America by the time we specified, (Namely, the middle or latter part of October), or, in other words, that we should now decide that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to" as specified under Section III of the "Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program" which was drawn up at a council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th. He thus concludes that the time has arrived for us to make up our minds to get ready for war against America. However, careful reconsideration of the situation leads me to the conclusion that, given time, the possibility of reaching an agreement with the United States is not hopeless. In particular, I believe that even the most difficult question involved, namely, that of the withdrawal of troops, can be settled if we are willing to sacrifice our honor to some extent and agree to the formula suggested by America. To plunge into a great war, the issue of which is most uncertain, at a time when the China Incident is still unsettled would be something which I could not possibly agree to, especially since I have

painfully felt my grave responsibility for the present state of affairs ever since the outbreak of the China Incident. It is vitally necessary now, not only to strengthen ourselves for the future but also to set the people's minds at ease, that the Cabinet and the Army and Navy cooperate in the closest possible manner in bringing to a successful conclusion the negotiations with America. Now is the time for us to sacrifice the present for the future and let our people concentrate their entire efforts for the prosperity of the Emperor and the nation. Thus I have done my utmost in stating my earnest convictions in an endeavor to persuade War Minister Tojo to accept my viewpoint. In response to this, the War Minister insisted that although he greatly appreciated my position and sincerity, it was impossible from the standpoint of preserving military morale for him to agree to the withdrawal of troops; that if we once gave in to America that country would become so arrogant that there would be no end of its depredations; and that even if we should be able to settle the China Affair now, Sino-Japanese relations would again reach a deadlock in a mere two or three years. He pointed [86] out that while there are certain weak points in our position America also has its weak points and that we should therefore grasp the present opportunity and get ready for war at once. I have had four serious conversations with him on this subject but was unable to change his position. It is therefore clear to me that my ideas will not prevail and that I shall be unable to carry out my responsibilities as an advisor to the Throne. I realize that this is entirely due to my insufficiency and I feel very humble as I approach the Throne. It is with trepidation that I present my request, but I humbly and sincerely ask that you relieve me of my present responsibilities.

October 16, 1941.

PRINCE FUMIMARO KONOYE,  
*Prime Minister.*

[87]

#### APPENDIX IX

#### THE DETAILS OF THE CABINET RESIGNATION AND THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF SENIOR STATESMEN FOLLOWING THE RESIGNATION OF THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET

##### I. *Differences between the Viewpoint of the Government and the Army.*

1. Concerning the "Decisions Reached at the Council in the Imperial Presence: "Clause 3 of the Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program", as decided upon at the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th, states: "If by the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to—we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America, England and Holland". The Army takes the position that the progress of the negotiations with America in the early part of October impels us to decide that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to", as referred to in the said article and that, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that by the middle or end of October we "must make up our minds to ready for war".

The Cabinet contends that not only have the diplomatic negotiations not reached a hopeless state, but that in the light of the diplomatic documents which we have received from America and many other reports, the American Government also entertains considerable hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. However, that Government harbors certain misunderstandings and suspicions (for example, the Army's gradual infiltration into Northern Indo-China in the early part of October, though, of course, this was carried out in harmony with definite treaty stipulations); is influenced by the deliberate misrepresentations of certain Third Powers, or is carefully watching the future of the international situation, especially of the European War. There are also activities on the part of strong anti-Japanese elements in the Far Eastern Sections of the State Department, activities which have covered up the true feelings of the President and Secretary of State Hull. In view of these facts, we can not decide that there is no hope of successful negotiations even with the present conditions as suggested by us, if time is allowed for the conduct of the negotiations. Especially, if we could get our Army authorities to relax their position somewhat, namely, with reference to the withdrawal of troops, we believe that there is a good possibility of reaching an agreement.

The Army feels that although the early part of October is the ideal time for us to decide on war in harmony with the demands of the Supreme Command, it can defer it till the middle of the month, but by all means not later than the

latter part of the month. Otherwise, the Army feels itself seriously handicapped in the event of war. It, therefore, rigidly adheres to the middle of the month, the latter part of October, as the time to decide upon war, should war be decided upon, and this is a point that must ever be kept in mind.

[88] 2. The obstacles in the negotiations with America (especially the problem of the withdrawal of troops); Diplomatic negotiations are still proceeding with America and while the true intentions of that country are not clear the following three points may be listed as the major unsolved problems:

- (1) The problem of stationing or withdrawal of troops from China.
- (2) Japan's attitude toward the Tri-Partite Pact.
- (3) The problem of non-discriminatory trade in the Pacific area.

Among the three, it is clear to all that the outstanding problem is the withdrawal of troops. In other words, that problem is really the one problem, the negotiations with America.

A summary of the Army's attitude concerning the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

Our Government's terms for a Sino-Japanese peace, as indicated to America are very liberal, inasmuch as they include the principles of no annexation and no reparations. They merely insist on the stationing of troops in certain areas for a stipulated period in order to facilitate cooperation with China in preventing the inroads of communism and any other movements tending to disrupt the present order. It is evident that these dangers are a threat to the safety of both Japan and China and to the welfare and prosperity of the peoples of both countries. These measures are also vitally necessary for the economic development of the country. It is, of course, understood that all troops not necessary for the above purposes will be withdrawn as soon as the China Incident is brought to a close. In view of the above, the stationing of troops in China is an absolutely necessary stipulation. In other words, the Army insists that this point is a consideration of first importance and that the stationing of these troops in China is, after all, the one and only tangible result of the China Incident. It follows that the Army can not agree to any plan which envisages the giving up of the right to station troops in China. If our troops' withdrawal from China is carried out, the Army will be overcome by a spirit of defeatism and it will be impossible to preserve its morale.

On the other hand, the final position of America on this matter of stationing troops is not yet clear. It may be possible if we give time for further negotiations to have our terms for the China problem agreed to by America. Up to the present, the American position in this matters seems to be as follows:

[89] (1) Japan is to agree in principle to the withdrawal of troops. (The matter of stationing troops in China must be decided after this principle has been accepted.) It is not clear at the present moment whether America will agree to the stationing of troops in China but in the light of the negotiations so far conducted, America's position does not seem to be entirely negative in the matter.

(2) America desires to be assured of Japan's sincerity in the matter of the withdrawal of troops. For instance, Under-Secretary Welles stated to Minister Wakasugi in Washington that if Japan was sincere in here decision to withdraw the troops, America was willing to give more consideration to the manner in which this should be done.

In the light of the above, the Cabinet's position in regard to the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

(1) Diplomatic negotiations should be continued for a longer period.

(2) We understand, of course, that the stationing of troops in China is a very necessary consideration. However, if the success or failure of the present negotiations hangs on this one problem, the Cabinet holds the view that it would be better for us to agree to the American formula for the withdrawal of troops and yet secure stationing of troops in China for a specified period.

3. *Views in Regard to War Against America:* The Army points out that as a result of the British and American freezing orders, the import of necessary materials (especially oil) has become almost impossible and our shortages will become so severe that should America come upon us with impossible demands, we shall find ourselves unable to resist even for the sake of defending our very existence. Therefore, the Army insists that even though the situation is fraught with certain dangers, there is no cause for alarm and that now is the time for us to take decisive action if our people stand united in a determination to overcome all obstacles, remembering that America as well as Japan has certain weaknesses.

The Army claims that if we propose too liberal terms through American good offices and settle the China Incident, China would learn to despise Japan and we would have to punish her again within two or three years.

I, as the Prime Minister, on the other hand, could not possibly entertain the idea of plunging into a great war with all its uncertainties at a time when the China Incident is still unsettled. Although, as the result of the freezing orders, we are faced with gradually shrinking stores of munitions of war, we believe that it is possible to take other means of replenishing our supplies, especially with reference to [90] oil. For even if we should capture the Netherlands East Indies, the necessary amount of oil could not be obtained within a year or two because installations would be destroyed and transportation would be difficult. It would be far better for us, instead of going to war, to mobilize all our labor and material resources and begin the manufacture of synthetic oil. We think it would not be impossible to produce 500,000 tons by the end of 1943 and 4,000,000 tons during 1944. As a result of our four years of struggle in China, our national strength has considerably deteriorated and the morale of our people has declined. Would it not be better at this time for us to eat the bitter, preserve our as yet undamaged Navy, settle the China Incident and gradually build up our national strength?

4. *The Attitude of the Navy:* The following is a summary of the Navy's attitude:

At the present time, we stand at the parting of the ways where we must make up our minds to either carry on diplomatic negotiations to the bitter end or declare war. If we decide to follow the path of diplomatic negotiations, we must make up our minds to give up the idea of declaring war. For us to carry on diplomatic negotiations for two or three months and then to declare war because we decide that further diplomatic negotiations would be fruitless is an impossibility. However the question as to whether we are going to declare war or choose the plan of diplomatic negotiation is one which the Government must decide. In other words, the Prime Minister must make the decision as to whether we are going to turn to the left or to the right. There are some in Navy circles who hold that war should be avoided at all costs and that we should do our best to adjust our relations with America through diplomatic negotiations.

## II. *The Progress of Diplomatic Negotiations with America.*

In the middle of April this year, Secretary of State Hull gave Ambassador Nomura a proposal for arriving at a Japanese-American understanding. Secretary of State Hull stated that a clarification of the attitudes and a settlement of the problems listed below would greatly contribute to adjusting our relations.

1. The attitude of both countries toward the European War.
2. The relationship of the two countries with reference to the China Incident.
3. Commerce between the two countries.
4. The policy of both countries with reference to the stability of the Pacific area.

The Secretary presented detailed observations on these matters.

[91] In the middle of May the Government and the Supreme Command held a conference and decided on Japan's answer to the American proposal. (Foreign Minister Matsuoka was returning from Europe at the end of April and this circumstance greatly delayed our answer).

In the latter part of June, America sent a further revised proposal. Just at that time, at the end of June, the German-Soviet War broke out and the international situation grew very complex. Furthermore, in order to prosecute the war on the Continent, we carried out a peaceful occupation of Southern French Indo-China in harmony with our agreement. America, in return, retaliated with her freezing order. This resulted in very strained relations between the two countries. About the middle of June, but before Ambassador Nomura delivered the same, Japan sent her answer to America's proposal of the latter part of June, the Second Konoye Cabinet resigned. In the early part of August, the Third Konoye Cabinet entered into earnest negotiations to bring about a meeting of the American President and Prime Minister Konoye in order to restore cordial relations, settle the China problem and discuss the question of world peace. Konoye sent a message to the American President the latter part of August. On the 6th of September, there was held a Council in the Imperial Palace which drew up the "Outline of the Plan for the Execution of the Imperial Program". Judging by the events occurring just before and just after that date, it was evidently the mind of the Council to carry on diplomatic negotiations with a view to settling all outstanding problems with America and England and bring an

end to the China Incident, and not to resort to war unless there was absolutely no possibility of reaching an agreement by these negotiations.

In the early part of September, we passed on our proposals for the problems to be discussed at the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister. On September 20th we sent a proposal to America embodying all the past proposals of both countries. On October 2nd the American authorities sent their answer in the form of a memo. The reception of this memorandum resulted in two schools of thought: One felt that America had no sincere intentions of concluding an agreement and that it would be fruitless to continue negotiations further. The other disagreed, taking the position that the situation was not hopeless and that negotiations should be continued although it might be necessary for us to modify our demands.